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Search (and matching) theory consists of a family of models that can be seen to ?ll
the ?gap? between the traditional Walrasian general equilibrium theory and isolated
partial equilibrium models that use game-theoretic analysis. A Walrasian competitive
equilibrium model implicitly assumes trading via centralized auctioneer in a setting
where all prices are publicly known to everyone and each agent has an instant and
frictionless access to any of the trading opportunities in the market. Strategic inter-
actions between agents are practically absent in that model - buyers and sellers only
interact through the price system, which they cannot in?uence. However, in many
markets, e.g. in labor and credit markets, there is no centralized auctioneer but the
prices are determined and transactions concluded in private meetings between buyers
and sellers. Moreover, agents typically have a limited, or at least costly, access to
other trading opportunities outside their current meeting.
Search-theoretic models are designed to incorporate these aspects. The assump-
tion of decentralized trading enables a more satisfactory characterization of strategic
interactions between trading partners than is possible in Walrasian context. Most no-
tably, it is possible to have proper micro-foundations for the price formation process.
In models with bilateral trading, some sort of bargaining game (or posted prices) is a
typical mode of price determination. In models where multiple simultaneous meetings
are possible, one can also utilize auction theory. Compared to purely game-theoretic
settings, search models remove the isolation of the analysis by providing the traders
with an option to break up the current meeting and start searching for other partners.
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Option to quit creates competitive pressure that a¤ects the outcome obtained in the
private meeting.
When one introduces a matching function that governs the overall meeting rates
and postulates market entry conditions, search models can be closed into general
equilibrium. Indeed, when search frictions become in?nitesimal, these models typically
produce Walrasian outcome as a limiting case.
1.1 A brief history of the economics of search
According to commonly held view the economics of search primarily began with
Stigler?s (1961) famous work on "The Economics of Information", although some other
authors, e.g., Simon (1955), had discussed related problems already earlier. Stigler?s
article was inspired by the observation that in most markets prices tends to change
with varying frequency, even though the selling goods were seemingly homogeneous.
Unless the market is completely centralized, no buyer will know all the prices various
sellers quote. Therefore a buyer who wishes to ?nd out the most favorable price has
to overcome this informational shortage by conducting search. Stigler then developed
a theory of how consumers should ?canvass? various sellers when search is costly and
only the distribution of prices is common knowledge. Stigler?s analysis was not re-
ally dynamic, as he asserted that consumers ought to visit a ?xed number of stores
and then buy from the seller with the lowest price. McCall (1965, 1970), Mortensen
(1970), Nelson (1970) and Gronau (1971) pointed out that Stigler?s decision rule is not
optimal and that the best practice would be to visit stores sequentially. Utilizing the
theory of optimal stopping rules, these authors developed the concept of reservation
price. The optimal sequential decision rule was such that the buyer should continue
searching if the lowest price observed up to that point exceeded the reservation price.
Another powerful criticism of Stigler?s theory was spelled out by Rothchild (1973), who
asserted that it is a "partial partial-equilibrium theory". The ?double partial? refers
to the fact that only one market is considered at a time and the analysis is restricted
to only one side of this market. Rothchild writes: "Although it [Stigler?s model] ex-
plains how customers should react to variability in price, it does not explain where
this variability comes from or what, if anything, preserves it." Hence, the punchline of
Rothchild?s critique was that as long as the behavior of price setters is unexplained, it
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cannot be a¤ected by consumers? choices and Stigler?s model is a completely isolated
environment without any strategic considerations.
Rothchild?s critique - which was widely recognized already a bit earlier than
Rothchild?s famous survey was published - triggered a considerable wave of research
trying to add the missing elements into Stigler?s analysis. A great number of authors
tried to construct a model where price dispersion would arise endogenously. However,
Diamond (1971), Rothchild (1973) and Butters (1977b) showed that price dispersion
tends to disappear when the pricing strategies are implemented in a simple market
setting. Diamond?s seminal paper concluded that when consumers employ sequential
search strategy and search costs are strictly positive, the only unique equilibrium
strategy for sellers is to ask monopoly prices. Monopoly pricing would hold regardless
of the number of sellers in the market and however small the search costs would be.
This result became known as Diamond Paradox.
Butters (1977a) noted that some deviation of the "simplest model" - wherein
identical consumers with unitary demand search sequentially, at a ?xed search cost,
over homogenous consumption goods - is required to obtain a non-degenerate price
dispersion. Butters (1977a) himself proposed such a deviation by allowing multi-
ple simultaneous meetings (a setting which became known as the ?urn-ball? model).
Reinganum (1979) demonstrated that a non-degenerate price distribution could be
obtained if one relaxed the assumptions of unitary demand and producer?s homoge-
nous cost structure. Burdett and Judd (1983) introduced a notion of noisy search,
while Stahl (1996) allowed a possibility that some consumers face zero search costs
and thereby visit all stores. In a more recent contribution, Arbatskaya (2004) argues
that price dispersion is obtained if the assumption of random search is replaced by
?ordered search?. The literature that avoids the Diamond Paradox by assuming some
sort of heterogeneity in the selling goods is immense. Anderson and Renault (1999)
provide an excellent discussion on this topic.
An intuitively very appealing explanation for equilibrium price (wage) dispersion
is provided by Julien, Kennes and King (2000), who develop a "competing-auction"
theoretic setting to model wage formation. In their model, each unemployed worker
announces a reserve wage (the lowest wage that would be acceptable for him) to attract
employers to trade with him. If only one employer approaches the worker, then trading
takes place at the reserve wage. If there will be more than one interested employer,
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then the worker sells his labor services to the highest bidder. This kind of structure
gives rise to wage dispersion even with completely homogeneous sellers (workers).
1.2 Popular application ?elds of search theory
Search theory has probably been most successful in labor economics. This is quite
natural, because labor markets are typically characterized by decentralized trading,
search frictions and various kinds of matching problems. The early contributions in
this tradition were Alchian (1969), Phelps (1968) and Mortensen (1970) - which were
collected with some other articles in the same spirit in the "Phelps volume" (Phelps et
al., 1970) - as well as McCall (1970) and Gronau (1971). The early theory of job search
su¤ered from the same criticism as Stigler?s model: the market was characterized by
an exogenous distribution of wage o¤ers and unemployment emerged as an equilibrium
phenomenon because workers rejected too low o¤ers. Lucas and Prescott (1974) were
the ?rst to develop an equilibrium model that met Rothchild?s (1973) criticism of
search models being "partial partial-equilibrium" analysis. Their model, however,
overlooked workers? option to search for alternative jobs and they did not consider the
market?s matching patterns that would directly relate unemployment to vacancies and
hirings. The ?rst applications that introduced the concept of the ?matching function?
in order to bypass the need to model reservation wages as the driving force behind
unemployment were due Hall (1979), Pissarides (1979), and Bowden (1980). Finally,
Pissarides (1979, 1984a) introduced a ?free-entry? condition for new jobs, leading to a
general equilibrium model with endogenous labor demand.
In recent years, the search and matching model, which is usually called the
Mortensen-Pissarides model, has become the standard theory of equilibrium unem-
ployment. The success of the Mortensen-Pissarides framework is due to its tractability
and its potential to tackle a wide array of relevant policy issues, such as unemploy-
ment insurance, taxation, minimum wages etc. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a,b)
and Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2004) provide extensive surveys on the recent de-
velopments of this convention. Also Pissarides? (2000) textbook is widely used as an
encyclopedic reference. The ?rst (Chapter II) and the third essay (Chapter IV) in this
dissertation are related to the trade in the labor market.
Search theory has also been employed to rationalize the use of money as a medium
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of exchange. In a frictionless world where complete contracts were possible, money
would not be needed because economic agents could agree on who produces what and
how the resulting outputs are shared. In a world with incomplete contracts and limited
access to potential trading opportunities, however, a trader does not necessarily ?nd
a partner with whom to exchange goods. The search models of money include, for
example, Diamond (1984), Kiyotaki and Wright (1991), Shi (1997) and Kocherlakota
(1998).
Pairwise trading is a typical mode of transaction also in certain segments of
?nancial markets, most notably in venture capital markets and, to some extent, in
credit markets. However, applying search theory to model ?nancial matching is a
relatively new area with only a handful of contributions (e.g. Becsi, Li and Wang,
2000, Wasmer and Weil, 2000, Michelacci and Suarez, 2002, and Inderst and Müller,
2004). The second essay (Chapter III) in this dissertation considers ?nancial matching
in the credit market context.
1.3 Some currently active areas of research
One of the current areas of interest is how the price determination process should
be modeled. In the early applications of search theory, price formation was typically
modeled as monopolistic price-setting by sellers (e.g. Mortensen, 1970, and Diamond,
1971). The Nash bargaining solution was ?rst introduced in this context by Diamond
(1982). The Mortensen-Pissarides model also utilizes Nash wage equation as a price
formation mechanism. This practice has been justi?ed by the observation (derived
by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986) that the outcome of Rubinstein?s (1982)
strategic bargaining game (the "alternating o¤ers? game") approaches the sharing rule
generated by the axiomatic, generalized Nash bargaining, if the time-interval between
sequential o¤ers approaches zero. Moreover, in search context, generalized Nash bar-
gaining is equivalent of having the trading partners making ?take-it-or-leave-it-o¤ers? to
their opponents with probabilities that are equal to the exogenous ?bargaining powers?
in the Nash solution. However, using Nash bargaining is not completely satisfactory
because the choice of the exogenous bargaining powers is arbitrary and it is usually
quite hard to identify proper micro-foundations that would support any particular
choice. A nice feature of bargaining models in general equilibrium search context is
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that the outside option (i.e., the option to leave the current meeting and start search-
ing for another partner) is endogenous. But even though the disagreement point in
Nash bargaining is indeed based on some economic fundamentals, the rule by which
the remaining surplus is divided is arbitrary.
The dominant role of Nash solution in the main stream search and matching
literature is somewhat bothersome because search models would typically allow a more
detailed price formation mechanism with proper micro-foundations. In recent years,
some authors have developed alternative ways to determine prices in search context.
For example, in models where multiple meetings are possible, one can utilize auction
theory, as is done by Kultti (1999) and Julien et al. (2000). In these models, there
will be several di¤erent prices at which trading takes place, depending on the number
of agents that meet each other. Kultti and Virrankoski (2004), in turn, postulate a
setting where competitive auctions are only an ?o¤-equilibrium-path? scenario, leading
to a unique price in the market.
These new openings are welcome because the conventional Mortensen-Pissarides
model has proved to generate some clearly counterfactual predictions - the main source
of which is the Nash bargaining used in wage determination. A major critique is spelled
out by Shimer (2004b) who argues that the Mortensen-Pissarides model is incapable
of explaining the cyclical behavior of its two central elements, namely unemployment
and vacancies. According to Shimer, this failure is mainly due to the fact that Nash
bargaining produces too little wage rigidity. Also the third essay of this disserta-
tion (Chapter IV), which is an extension of the Kultti-Virrankoski model, shows that
when workers are vertically di¤erentiated, Nash bargaining could miss some important
economic insight.
Another area that has generated interest is the attempt to reconsider the issues
of economics of information in search theoretic models. The reason why search models
are attractive also in this respect stems from their nature as ?intermediate cases? be-
tween competitive equilibrium theory and isolated game-theoretic models. As the ?rst
essay of this dissertation (Chapter II) exempli?es, the assumption of private meetings
and search frictions can help to avoid the stability problems related to signaling mod-
els in competitive environment. On the other hand, the option to quit the current
meeting and search for another trading partner adds some competitive ?avor to the
simplistic principal-agent -setting where the principal acts as a Stackelberg leader. Es-
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say II (Chapter III), besides other things, shows that in search models it is possible to
construct a bilateral trading process that avoids the complexities related to bargain-
ing games with asymmetric information (see for example Muthoo, 1999, ch. 9.8, and
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch. 10.4) but, unlike the principal-agent -models, still
retains at least some market power also to the informed party. Blouin (2002), in turn,
shows that the Akerlof?s (1970) ?impasse? - a situation where the quality of a good is
seller?s private information and the presence of low quality goods drives the market
price so low that sellers of high quality goods refuse to trade - does not necessarily
emerge in a model with pairwise trading. Dam and Pérez-Castrillo (2003) postulate
the principal-agent economy as a two sided matching game and characterize the set of
stable outcomes of such market. Their main aim is to develop a framework for analyz-
ing the principal-agent relationship not as an isolated entity but as a part of an entire
market where several principals and agents interact. Also Shimer (2004a) examines
moral hazard problem related to employment relationships in search equilibrium.
2 Summaries of the essays
This section provides brief summaries of the three essays in the order of their appear-
ance.
2.1 Essay I: "Overinvestment vs. underinvestment in educa-
tional signals: A search-theoretic approach"
In his famous work, Spence (1973, 1974) asserted that employers? inability to observe
workers? true productivity prior to hiring could lead to a separating equilibrium where
workers with di¤erent marginal products acquire di¤erent levels of education in order
to signal their innate and unobservable types. The ?rst essay (Chapter II) re-examines
this idea in a search-theoretic framework.
In the extreme version of Spence?s theory, education per se did not contribute
to labor productivity but could only be used as a signaling device. Since acquiring
degrees in the schooling sector was thought to be costly, the signaling motive inevitably
led to ?overeducation? and e¢ciency losses. Riley (1979) extended Spence?s original
model and postulated that schooling and workers? marginal products were positively
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related. Riley?s ?rst observation was that a separating equilibrium de?ned by Spence
would not exist in a Walrasian competitive equilibrium model. In order to resolve
the existence issue, Riley introduced a re?nement to that equilibrium concept (so
called reactive equilibrium) and derived a unique separating equilibrium where the
least able type chooses his ?rst-best educational level while the more able workers
overinvest in schooling in order to separate themselves from the less able colleagues.
This result became known as the ?Riley outcome?. The ?overinvestment? result of the
Riley outcome has also been veri?ed in explicitly game-theoretic models of sequential
moves, where the informed party acts as a Stackelberg leader (see Cho and Kreps,
1987).
In our search-theoretic model, the signaling motive does not always lead to overe-
ducation. Instead, undereducation may arise at least within a subset of types. The
main reason for the qualitative di¤erences between our results and the Riley outcome
is that in our case wage formation is modeled as a decentralized bargaining game; i.e.,
the surplus generated by a successful match in the labor market is divided among the
trading partners according to the sharing rule obtained in wage bargaining. Hence, the
private return for a worker from schooling is generally less than the social return. As
a result, the signaling motive is not always strong enough to induce socially adequate
investment in education. In Riley?s ?quasi-competitive? model, in turn, employers are
competitive so that workers are able to capture the whole social surplus from edu-
cation. Given the congruence of the private and social returns, the signaling motive
unambiguously induces overeducation.
As a theoretical contribution, we also note that search model can avoid the non-
existence problem characteristic to Walrasian analysis. The main reason for the non-
existence of a competitive separating equilibrium is the assumption of centralized
trading where all agents have simultaneous and frictionless access to the same trading
opportunities and all prices are publicly known to everyone. Under decentralized
trading, however, all transactions are concluded in private between employers and
workers, and moving from one trading opportunity to another entails search frictions.
As a result, the possible separating equilibrium is not vulnerable to the costless rent-
seeking behavior that is present in Walrasian context.
The equilibrium signaling pro?le derived in the essay is typically not unique but
we argue that the set of equilibria can be restricted by an ?intuitive criterion?. Greater
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search frictions in the labor market tend to amplify underinvestment. On the other
hand, if these frictions become in?nitesimal, the model produces the Riley outcome as
a limiting case. A rather surprising observation is that, if overeducation is the more
dominant source of ine¢ciency in the labor market, increasing search frictions may
actually improve educational e¢ciency. We also ?nd that increasing complementarity
between education and innate ability tends to worsen the ine¢ciencies caused by un-
dereducation among the low-skilled and overeducation among the high-skilled. If one
assumes that increasing complementarity between education and ability is due to a
?skill-biased? technological change, our model predicts that such a skill-biased devel-
opment would compound the inequality in both education levels and wages. Finally,
we conclude that, depending on whether overeducation or undereducation is the most
prominent problem, a regulator can improve e¢ciency by introducing either a system
of income taxes or schooling subsidies.
As the model is closed into a general labor market equilibrium, we ?nd that if the
complementarity between workers? innate ability and schooling in terms of productiv-
ity is su¢ciently strong, the model may exhibit multiple (two) stead state equilibria.
Typically, one of the steady states is characterized by high unemployment and severe
undereducation while the other steady state entails lower unemployment and better
educated workers. Multiplicity of steady states implies the possibility of ?Big-Push?
development á la Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991); i.e., even small improvements
in market infrastructure may lead to a considerable leap from a sub-optimal steady
state to a unique and a more e¢cient steady state.
2.2 Essay II: "Asymmetric information in credit markets and
entrepreneurial risk taking"
The essay (Chapter III) investigates the e¢ciency of loan contracts between ?nanciers
and entrepreneurs in a credit market with asymmetric information, search frictions
and decentralized trading. The novel feature in the paper is that the ?nancier can
distinguish between ?risky? and ?safe? projects, but the entrepreneur?s ability that gov-
erns the success probability of the risky investment is unobservable to the ?nancier.
Hence, the e¢ciency of trading is driven by entrepreneurs? self-selection among the
business opportunities. The previous literature (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, and
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de Meza and Webb, 1987) typically assumes that entrepreneurs are bound to uniform
investment opportunities. Moreover, instead of assuming perfect competition among
?nanciers, it is assumed that all transactions are concluded in private meetings be-
tween entrepreneurs and ?nanciers and that movement from one trading opportunity
to another is restricted by search frictions. The assumption of decentralized trading
also entails a theoretical contribution that stems form the way the pairwise bargain-
ing under asymmetric information is treated. The well-known complexities related to
asymmetric information in Rubinstein?s (1982) strategic bargaining game (see for ex-
ample Muthoo,1999, ch. 9.8 and Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch. 10.4) are avoided by
assuming that only the uninformed party, i.e. the ?nancier, is allowed to make o¤ers
in a take-it-or-leave-it manner. However, borrowers are assumed to have an option to
continue search meanwhile negotiating with the ?nancier. If the borrower exercised
this option and managed to locate another ?nancier, the two competing ?nanciers
would bid for the right to ?nance the entrepreneur?s project.
It is shown that e¢cient resource allocation can take place only under su¢ciently
?liquid? market conditions; i.e., when the number of ?nanciers in the credit market is
large enough compared to the number of loan applicants. Better market liquidity in-
creases the rate at which a competing ?nancier can be located, which unambiguously
improves entrepreneurs? ?bargaining power?. As a result, entrepreneurs? private return
from ?nancial matching comes closer to the available social return so that entrepre-
neurs face greater incentives to select projects e¢ciently. Under tight (i.e. illiquid)
market conditions, ine¢ciencies in resource allocation may be due to either excessive
investment in risky projects or entrepreneur?s refusal to take up risky projects at all
(extreme underinvestment). This result somewhat contradicts with the implications
of the model by Becsi, Li and Wang (2003). Becsi et al. endogenize market entry by
borrowers and conclude that greater credit market tightness discourages low-quality
borrowers disproportionately, leading to higher average quality of projects. We also
note that greater credit market tightness can, in a sense, be interpreted as less intense
competition between ?nanciers. According such interpretation, our result contradicts
with the commonly held view that ?nancial sector competition is likely to induce risk
taking and thereby ?nancial fragility.
Regarding the role of search frictions in the market, we ?nd that improving
matching e¢ciency (i.e. lower search frictions) tends to increase, ceteris paribus, the
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probability of adverse selection. This is because greater matching rates increase the
value of entrepreneurs? option to continue search and the expected utility available
from risky projects increases disproportionately. As a result, risky investments be-
come relatively more attractive than safe projects, and the likelihood of excessive
investment in risky projects increases. Since lower search frictions increase the to-
tal number of matches, our model produces a trade-o¤ between the total volume of
trading and the average quality of entrepreneurial projects. As the search frictions
become in?nitesimal, each agent has an immediate access to any trading opportunity
in the market so that a competitive equilibrium - the framework of the models by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and Webb (1987) - is obtained as a limiting
case. However, the general trade-o¤ between quality and quantity along with more
e¢cient matching does not necessarily imply that there would be adverse selection in
the competitive limit. Which allocative regime is in e¤ect depends primarily on the
market tightness and on the distribution of types.
2.3 Essay III: "Non-linear wages and the distribution of skills"
The third essay (Chapter IV) constructs a theory of wage formation in a continuous-
time search model with heterogeneous labor. The main purpose of the essay is to
develop a pricing mechanism that produces an endogenous sharing rule arising from
economic fundamentals and which establishes a theoretical linkage between equilib-
rium wage di¤erentials and the distribution of skills. Neither of these features typically
arise in models with one-sided heterogeneity where the transferable surplus is divided
according to an exogenous sharing rule, e.g. Nash bargaining.
This essay draws from the recent contribution by Kultti and Virrankoski (2004),
whose model, in turn, rests on the work by Julien, Kennes and King (2000) and
Kultti (2000). The main idea in the Kultti-Virrankoski model is that if trading in a
private meeting between a buyer and a seller seems unfavorable for either party, the
dissatis?ed partner may choose to wait for other agents to show up. Appearance of
another seller triggers a Bertrand-like price competition. Instead, if another buyer is to
show up, the competing buyers are driven to a bidding contest. Kultti and Virrankoski
show that, if at the initial meeting either of the trading partners can propose the ?rst
o¤er in a ?take-it-or-leave-it? fashion, then waiting is ?o¤-equilibrium? event and the
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agent with the ?rst-mover advantage will propose an o¤er that is just good enough to
prevent the opponent from exercising his waiting option. The current essay utilizes
this idea in the context of labor markets where employers possess the right to propose
initial wage o¤ers. The essay also extends the Kultti-Virrankoski model by assuming
heterogeneous workers.
The main ?nding in the essay is that the equilibrium wages are non-linear with
respect to workers? skills: better skilled workers earn strictly larger fraction of the
matching surplus than workers belonging to lower skill groups. This is because the
?wait-and-continue-search? option is disproportionately more valuable for the more
skilled than for the less skilled worker. The disparity is the greater the larger is the
fraction of workers belonging to skill groups below the more able worker. Our result
contrasts with the outcome from Nash bargaining, under which wages are typically
linear in the sense that the price of the productivity unit is the same for all skill
groups. Moreover, under exogenous Nash sharing rule, the skill composition of the
work force does not a¤ect the shape of the wage schedule. Instead, our model predicts
that a high-skilled worker is able to extract more surplus from the employer when there
are only few equally able workers in the market than in the case when the market is
?ooded with high-skilled workers.
Non-linearity of wages implies that a mean-preserving spread in the skill distrib-
ution leads to greater wage dispersion. We also show that if the skill distribution of
a country A is ?better? than that of a country B in a ?rst-order stochastic dominance
sense, then the wage structure should be narrower in country A than in country B:
Moreover, non-linear wages o¤er a potential explanation for the puzzling trend that
a substantial growth in the relative supply of skilled labor has in most industrialized
economies been accompanied by increasing ?skill premium? in wages (cf. Katz and
Autor, 1999, for an overview). Many previous studies (e.g. Katz et al., 1993, Katz
and Autor, 1999, and Krusell et al. 2000) assert that a strong skill-biased technologi-
cal change has to be the key factor explaining the phenomenon. However, our theory
suggests that, if there is a common increase in labor productivity throughout the
skill groups, then workers belonging to upper tail skill groups should gain dispropor-
tionately. Therefore even if the distribution of skills would be transformed to weight
higher skill groups, the wage dispersion may still generally increase if the magnitude
of the productivity upgrade is su¢ciently large. Hence, non-linear wages mitigate the
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need for strong skill-biased technological change to explain the simultaneous increase
in both supply and price of skilled labor.
An increase in labor market tightness is shown to increase the lower tail wage
di¤erentials. However, we identify a La¤er-curve type relationship between market
tightness and upper tail wage gaps. When the labor market is su¢ciently tight initially,
a marginal increase in labor demand tends to increase the upper tail wage dispersion.
But when the market is ?slack? ex ante, increasing demand actually compresses upper
tail wages. This is because a marginal increase in demand dilutes part of the high-
skilled workers? comparative advantage when vacant jobs are the short side of the
market.
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Chapter II
Overinvestment vs. underinvestment in
educational signals: A search-theoretic
approach
Abstract
We consider Spence?s (1973, 1974) idea of job market signalling in a continu-
ous time search model, where workers invest in education to accumulate human
capital and to signal their privately known ?types?. We show that when wages
are determined according to a decentralized bargaining game and when moving
from one trading opportunity to another is restricted by search frictions, the
signalling motive does not always lead to overeducation. Instead, undereduca-
tion may arise at least within a subset of types. Greater search frictions amplify
undereducation. As search frictions become in?nitesimal, the ?Riley outcome?
holds as a limiting case; i.e. each type, except the least able worker, overin-
vests in education. We also ?nd that technological development tends to worsen
undereducation among the low types and compound dispersion in education lev-
els and wages. On the market level, undereducation may give rise to multiple
steady state equilibria.
1 Introduction
In his seminal work, Spence (1973, 1974) suggested that di¢culties in observing the
marginal product of workers prior to hiring could result in an equilibrium where em-
ployers? wage o¤ers were based on the observable education levels; i.e., workers might
be able to signal their unobservable ?types? by means of their education choices. The
necessary preconditions for the existence of such a separating regime would be that
workers with greater productivity would also face smaller marginal cost in acquiring
education and that the equilibrium wage function (contingent upon the signals) would
induce the workers of each type to choose di¤erent education levels.
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We reconsider Spence?s idea in a simple continuous-time search model where all
transactions are concluded and wages determined in private meetings between employ-
ers and workers. The sequential structure of the model is as follows: Before entering
the labor market, workers optimize their education choices, given the prevailing wage
function conditional upon educational signals. The wage function, in turn, results
from the bilateral bargaining, given the workers? optimal education choices at the ex
ante stage. Our model incorporates both the human capital aspect of education as
well as the signaling hypothesis1; i.e., besides functioning as a signaling device, edu-
cation also contributes to the marginal product of labor. Following Riley (1979), it is
assumed that education and innate ability are complementary in production.
Besides Spence?s path-breaking ideas, also Riley?s (1979) analysis has become an
important benchmark in the job market signaling literature. His main observation was
that a Walrasian separating equilibrium is generally instable because under publicly
known prices and free access to any trading opportunity there would always remain
unexploited rents for price searching buyers2. In order to resolve this problem, Riley
introduced a re?nement to the Walrasian equilibrium - so called reactive equilibrium
- and concluded that only one separating regime would reach stability under the new
equilibrium concept. The unique separating equilibrium entailed the Pareto-dominant3
signaling pro?le where the least able type chooses his ?rst-best education level while
the more able workers overinvest in schooling in order to separate themselves from
the less able colleagues. This result became known as the ?Riley outcome?. The same
result typically holds also in explicitly game-theoretic models, where the informed
1The empirical literature provides a rather con?icting view on which of the two aspects is more
profound. The traditional human capital literature initiated by Becker (1964) emphasizes the role
of education in determining labor productivity, while evidence from so called ?sorting models? (e.g.,
Kang and Bishop, 1986 and Altonji, 1995) stress the signalling role of education. However, Chatterji,
Seaman and Singell (2003) ?nd quite strong evidence that workers invest in education both because
it improves their productivity and because it distinguishes them from less able colleagues.
2A few years earlier, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (in the context of a two class model) and
Riley (1975) (with continuum of types) had already shown that an ?informationally consistent? wage
function (the term informationally consistent pricing was used in the 1970s when the particular price
function supported separating behavior) did not necessarily arise as an extension of the Walrasian
price vector.
3Or second-best, so to say.
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party acts as a Stackelberg leader4.
In our search-theoretic model, however, the signaling motive does not always
lead to overeducation. Instead, undereducation may arise at least within a subset
of types. The main reason for the qualitative di¤erences between our results and
the Riley outcome is that in our case wage formation is modeled as a decentralized
bargaining game. Upon a meeting, the unemployed worker (the ?rm) proposes a wage
demand (o¤er) in a ?take-it-or-leave-it? fashion with probability ° (1¡°)5. In the case
of disagreement, trading partners separate and receive their reservation utilities6 ;7.
If ° < 1, employers earn a strictly positive fraction of the surplus generated by a
successful recruitment so that the private return for a worker from schooling is less
than the social return. As a result, the signaling motive may not be strong enough
to induce socially adequate investment in education. In Riley?s ?quasi-competitive?
model, employers are always driven to their reservation utility levels so that workers
are able to capture the whole social surplus from education. Overeducation then
follows from the congruence of the private and social returns. We also note that our
model is not vulnerable to the same rent-seeking behavior that is present in Walrasian
context because all transactions are concluded in private meetings and moving from
one trading opportunity to another is encumbered by search frictions.
We ?nd that the equilibrium signaling pro?le is typically not unique but the set
4Cho and Kreps (1987) were the ?rst to provide a complete game-theoretic analysis of the Spence?s
model. They concluded that only the sequential equilibrium (this equilibrium concept was originally
due to Kreps and Wilson, 1982, while besides Cho and Kreps, also Banks and Sobel, 1987, introduced
further re?nements to it) that corresponded to the Riley outcome was ?intuitive?.
5This practice is simpler than Rubinstein?s (1982) ?alternating o¤ers game? in the sense that it does
not allow for countero¤ers. It should also be noted that this type of bargaining produces a sharing
rule that coincides with the outcome from generalized Nash bargaining with exogenous ?bargaining
powers? ° and 1 ¡ °.
6Since any rejection leads to immediate separation, the model does not allow the possibility of
strategic delays for signalling purposes (e.g. Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson, 1986, Gul and Sonnen-
schein, 1988, and Admati and Perry, 1987).
7Still, our simple bargaining mechanism does not rule out the possibility that informed agents
could try to transmit information about their types by making unexpected o¤ers, which again could
potentially lead to a great multiplicity of di¤erent type of equilibria (see Muthoo, 1999, ch. 9.8 and
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch. 10.4). However, these considerations are beyond the scope of the
study because we are focusing on wage functions that support separating regimes where educational
signals reveal all the relevant information about worker characteristics.
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of ?intuitive? signaling pro?les can be restricted to the set of pro?les between the ?min-
imum signaling pro?le? (the MS-pro?le) and the pro?le that induces the least type
to invest e¢ciently (the LTE-pro?le). It is shown that the MS-pro?le entails under-
investment in education at least within a subset of ?lower-tail? types. The extent of
undereducation in the MS-equilibrium, or in other intuitive regimes, depends crucially
on the prevailing market conditions; i.e. whether the labor market is ?tight? or ?slack?,
or how severe the search frictions are. Moreover, the Pareto-dominant pro?le (the
PD-pro?le) is not necessarily ?intuitive? which means that sometimes not even the
second-best outcome is feasible. However, as the search frictions become in?nitesimal,
the MS-pro?le, the LTE-pro?le and the PD-pro?le all coincide so that the equilibrium
signaling pro?le is unique and the ?Riley outcome? emerges as a limiting case.
Greater search frictions in the labor market are shown to amplify underinvest-
ment. Interestingly, if overeducation is the dominant source of ine¢ciency, increasing
search frictions may improve e¢ciency in the acquisition of education. Depending on
whether undereducation or overeducation is the most prominent problem, a regulator
can improve e¢ciency by introducing either a system of income taxes or schooling
subsidies. We also ?nd that an exogenous improvement in technological development
tends to worsen undereducation among the low types and lead to greater dispersion
in both education levels and wages.
Underinvestment in education is a common phenomenon in pure human capital
models (e.g. Laing, Palivos and Wang, 1995). In those models, undereducation arises
whenever workers have to bear all the schooling costs but can only earn part of the
extra surplus due additional schooling; i.e., when the private return from education is
less than the social return. The possibility of inadequate education in a model with
asymmetric information has previously been studied by Stiglitz (1975), who asserts
that ?social return? on schooling may in some cases exceed ?private return?, if the sig-
naling somehow improves the ?match? between workers and jobs8. However, Stiglitz?s
argument implicitly assumes heterogeneity also on employers? side of the market - a
feature that is not incorporated in the current model. In our case, bilateral trading
and search frictions su¢ce to give rise to ine¢ciently low levels of education. Swinkels
8Stiglitz?s argument rests on the assumption that the abilities that correlate with schooling improve
productivity on some ?specialized? vacancies but not on all jobs.
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(1999)9, in turn, modi?es the basic set-up by assuming that employers can make wage
o¤ers to students already in the process of schooling and derives a unique sequential
equilibrium that entails no wasteful education. He also shows that when education is
productive, there is a semi-separating equilibrium in which more able workers become
undereducated.
In the ?nal section of the current paper, the model is closed into a general labor
market equilibrium. A steady state analysis is carried out according to the matching
framework postulated by Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995), whose model, in turn,
rests on the pioneering works of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides
(1984, 2000). Reminiscent of the results derived by Laing et al. (1995), we ?nd
that the underinvestment problem may hinder job creation when the labor market
is ?slack?; i.e., when the number of vacant jobs is relatively low compared to the
number of unemployed in the market. This feature gives rise to a rather surprising
dynamics: As improvements in workers? position reduce undereducation, market entry
by ?rms may sometimes be stimulated by employers? lowering share of the matching
surplus. Such an adverse relationship is the more likely to occur the weaker is workers?
bargaining power at the wage negotiation stage. Due to this feature, multiple (two)
steady state equilibria may arise. Typically, one of the steady states is a ?development
trap? characterized by high unemployment and severe undereducation while the other
steady state features lower unemployment and better educated workers. Along the
lines of Laing et al. (1995), our model suggests that small improvements in market
infrastructures may lead to a considerable leap from the development trap to a unique
and a more e¢cient steady state. The model therefore predicts a possibility of ?Big-
Push? development á la Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. In Section
3, the concept of a separating equilibrium is de?ned and the model solved accordingly.
Section 4 is devoted to analyzing the properties of the possible signaling pro?les.
Finally, in Section 5, the model is closed into a general equilibrium and a steady state
9Swinkels? model is designed to answer the critique of Weiss (1983) and Admati and Perry (1987),
who point out that, as students begin education, the separation has already occurred so that overed-
ucation could be avoided if employers were allowed to make o¤ers as soon as students enroll classes.
This extension has also been explored by Nöldeke and Van Damme (1990) whose model, contrary to
Swinkels, produces the Riley outcome as a limiting case.
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analysis is examined. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of in?nitely lived and risk neutral workers
and by a continuum of impersonal ?rms. Firms open vacancies that require a labor
input of exactly one worker.
2.1 Heterogeneous labor
Workers are heterogeneous and the ?type? of a worker is denoted by µ 2 £. This
parameter serves as a measure for labor productivity so that a worker with higher µ
can produce more output than a colleague with lower µ.
* Assumption 1 : The type of a worker µ is distributed on £ = [µl; µh] according
to a strictly increasing function F (µ). F (µ) is common knowledge, while the
actual realization of µ is each worker?s private information.
2.2 Schooling
Before entering labor market, workers may devote e¤ort in acquiring some level of
schooling, s 2 S = [0;1)10, in education sector. For simplicity, it is assumed that
schooling is a one shot investment, the cost of which, C (µ; s) depends on the chosen
education level, s, and on the type of the agent, µ.
* Assumption 2 :
Cs > 0; Cµ < 0; and Csµ < 0; Css > 0:
In Assumption 2, the lower indices denote partial derivatives. The third partial
derivative, Csµ < 0; guarantees that the ?rst necessary precondition for the existence
of a separating equilibrium is satis?ed; i.e., workers with greater productivity face
smaller marginal cost in acquiring education. The properties of C (µ; s) are common
knowledge.
10Hence, there is no upper bound for how much a single worker can choose to take education.
Having an upper bound for schooling would only limit the set of feasible separating equilibria; for a
detailed discussion, see Riley (1979).
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After obtaining diploma from the education sector, workers are ready to enter
the labor market and start searching for a job as an unemployed worker.
2.3 Search and matching output
We utilize a simple continuous-time search model where an unemployed worker locates
a ?rm with an open vacancy at a Poisson arrival rate ® and a ?rm locates an unem-
ployed worker at rate ¯. Even though individual agents take ® and ¯ as exogenously
given, they will be endogenously determined in a steady state general equilibrium.
Steady state analysis is carried out in Section 5. Each economic agent discounts fu-
ture income with the common discount rate, r > 0. Search e¤ort itself is costless
but time consuming. Therefore the size of the discount rate re?ects the exogenous
search frictions in the market, while the endogenous meeting rates ® and ¯ describe
the steady state congestion in each side of the market.
We follow here Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995) by assuming that once an unem-
ployed worker and an un?lled job have been matched, the trading partners establish a
?lifelong? relationship11. Each successful match generates a perpetual stream of output
which is determined by worker?s type, µ, and his education level, s. The present value
of this in?nite ?ow of output is denoted by V (µ; s) :
* Assumption 3 :
Vµ > 0; Vs > 0; Vµµ < 0; Vss < 0 and Vsµ > 0.
Assumption 3 states that both the worker?s innate type and education contribute
positively to the productivity of labor, albeit at a diminishing rate. Moreover, the
cross-derivative Vsµ > 0 implies that schooling and ability are complementary in pro-
duction.
2.4 The Bellman equations
Separating regime requires that the available wage rate in the labor market must be
conditional upon the observable level of schooling; i.e., w = w(s). The discounted
11Thus, there is no exogenous ?job destruction? and thereby no risk of falling back into the pool of
unemployed workers.
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e¡(¿¡t)rw (s) d¿ :
Henceforth, we will work with the function W (s) and it will be referred as the wage
function of the labor market, even though it literally represents the present value of a
perpetual income stream.
Assuming that working e¤ort does not cause any disutility, risk-neutrality implies
that the discounted value of being employed is given by
JE (µ; s) = W (s) : (1)
Since an unemployed worker locates a potential employer at rate ®, the value of being
unemployed obtains
rJU (µ; s) = ®
¡
JE (µ; s)¡ JU (µ; s)¢ ; (2)
Regarding employers? pay-o¤s, the value available from a ?lled vacancy is
¼F (µ; s) = V (µ; s)¡ JE (µ; s) : (3)
Moreover, given that ?rms locate workers at rate ¯, the expected present value of



















¼j (µ; s) dF (µ) , j = U;F:
2.5 Bargaining12
Upon meeting, worker and ?rm negotiate over the division of the surplus generated
by the match. The bargaining process is modeled as a bargaining game where the un-
employed worker is allowed to propose a wage demand in a ?take-it-or-leave-it? fashion
12As already noted above, focusing on separating regimes guarantees that the bargaining with
educational signals can be treated as if there were no asymmetric information concerning workers?
innate abilities Under separating regime, the observable education level of a worker fully reveals the
unobservable productivity of the particular worker.
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with probability ° while the employer is in a similar position with the complementary
probability 1¡°.13 Generally, an equilibrium strategy in the bargaining game is to de-
mand or o¤er a wage that makes the trading partner indi¤erent between accepting the
o¤er and continuing search. Hence, the party who receives the wage o¤er is driven to
his reservation utility level. When the unemployed worker is to propose the o¤er, the
resulting wage demand captures the net of the gross output from the match, V (µ; s) ;




. On the other hand, when
the employer makes the o¤er, he o¤ers a future income stream equivalent to the value
of being unemployed, JU (µ; s). Therefore, the value of the income stream earned by
a worker with education s is the weighted average of these two o¤ers:
W (s) = °
¡
V (µ; s)¡ E £¼U (µ; s)¤¢+ (1¡ °)JU (µ; s) : (5)
3 Separating equilibrium
De?nition 1 Separating equilibrium is a wage-function W (s) s.t. (i) workers of type
µ choose
s = g¡1 (µ) ;
where
g¡1 (µ) 2 argmax
s2S
U (µ; s) =
©
JU (µ; s)¡ C (µ; s)ª 8µ;
and (ii) 9 [s
¯
; 1] ½ S s.t. g : [s
¯
; 1] ! R+is strictly and monotonically increasing with
µl ¸ g (s¯) ;
and (iii) W (s) results from the sharing rule expressed in (5) :
Condition (i) in De?nition 1 requires that the educational signals result from
workers? optimization problem at the ex ante stage, given the prevailing wage function
in the labor market. Condition (ii), in turn, requires that for each education level there
is exactly one worker type who has chosen that particular signal, and that employers
can infer higher schooling e¤ort to indicate higher ability14. Finally, condition (iii)
13This type of bargaining produces a sharing rule that coincides with the outcome from generalized
Nash bargaining.
14If this was not the case, Assumption 1 implies that it would always pay for the ?low-type? workers
to imitate the ?high-types?. Therefore, a signaling pro?le that is decreasing along with worker?s type
cannot establish a stable separating equilibrium.
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states that, given workers? optimal signaling strategies, the equilibrium wage schedule
results from the sharing rule expressed in equation (5).
The model will be solved in the spirit of backward induction: We start with
condition (iii) and determine wages as a function of the educational signals. Then,
given the wage function, we proceed with condition (i) and derive worker?s optimal
schooling e¤ort at the ex ante stage. As a ?nal step, we need to make sure that the
possible signaling pro?les are consistent with condition (ii).
Step 1: Characterization of the wage function Given that workers have chosen
the education levels according to the separating regime, plugging (2) and (4) into the
sharing-rule in (5) ; and utilizing (1) and (3), we have
W (s) =
° (® + r)
°® + r
¡
V (h (s) ; s)¡ E £¼U (h (s) ; s)¤¢ ; (6)
where h (s) = µ.
Now, consider a schooling level s+¢: Then the corresponding wage satis?es15
W (s+¢) =
° (® + r)
°®+ r
¡
V (h (s+¢) ; s+¢)¡ E £¼U (h (s) ; s)¤¢ : (7)
Subtracting (6) from (7), rearranging terms and dividing both sides by ¢ gives the
di¤erence quotient:





[V (h (s+¢) ; s+¢)¡ V (h(s); s)]
¢
:
Now, letting ¢ ! 0; we have the ?rst derivative of the wage function w.r.t. schooling,
W 0 (s) =
° (® + r)
°® + r
[Vµh
0 (s) + Vs] ; (8)
where the lower indices again denote partial derivatives.
Step 2: Optimal investment in educational signals Workers? optimal signaling
pro?le is determined by the following program for each type µ 2 £:
max
s
JU (µ;W (s))¡ C (µ; s) :




, because the employers? ?outside option? is the same
upon every match.
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The ?rst-order necessary condition gives
®
® + r
W 0 (s)¡ Cs = 0:




0 (s) + Vs]¡ Cs = 0; (9)







Equation (10) is an ordinary di¤erential equation. As noted by Riley (1979), this
kind of ODE has family of solutions of type
µ = h (s) = g (s;k) ; (11)
where k is an integrating constant. From (11), one can solve the equilibrium signaling
as a function of worker?s type:
s = g¡1 (µ; k) : (12)
Equation (10) gives the slope of the function g (¢; ¢). Di¤erentiating this expression
















which means that the equilibrium signaling pro?le may exhibit both convex and con-
cave parts in sµ-space.










2 , where A rep-
























Moreover, h00 (s) > 0 so that the function g (¢; ¢) is convex. The solution to this ODE
is





s ¡ µ ln s+ k:

















Figure 1: Three possible signaling pro?les
Step 3: Veri?cation of condition (ii) According to condition (ii) in De?nition
1, we must have h0 (s) > 0, which means that the innate type of a worker, µ; and his
education choice, s, are positively related. Clearly, this necessary precondition is not
automatically satis?ed in (10). However, by convexity of C and concavity of V w.r.t.
s we know that the numerator of (10) inevitably turns positive after some threshold s
¯
.
According to Riley (1979), it is simply a matter of choosing k such that µl ¸ g (s¯; k)
(required by condition (ii)). In Figure 1, g (s; k00) establishes a separating equilibrium
while g (s; k0) does not. Note that g (s;k00) is the minimum signaling pro?le in the
sense that µl = g (s¯
; k); i.e., the least able worker chooses education level s
¯
at which
the pro?le g (s; k) turns upward-sloping. The lowest schooling level, s
¯
, can be found
at the point where °®+r
°®
Cs = Vs. Of course, also some other signaling pro?les, like
g (s; k000), may establish separating regimes. The next section discusses which pro?les
are ?intuitive?.
Before that, it is instructive to derive the equilibrium wage function, given the







so that the equilibrium wage schedule yields
W (g¡1 (µ)) =
® + r
®
C(µ; g¡1 (µ)) +K; (14)
where constant K can be interpreted as a base salary to be paid for each worker,
regardless of his type. According to (14), the equilibrium wage function is such that,
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at the time of investment in schooling, the present value of the marginal increase in
wages in response to a marginal increase in education level just o¤-sets the marginal
costs from additional schooling e¤ort; i.e., workers? behave as Stackelberg leaders by
choosing education at the level where the marginal bene?t and the (personal) marginal
cost from education balance.
4 Properties of the signaling pro?les
4.1 A benchmark: First-best signaling pro?le
As a benchmark, let us start with characterizing socially optimal education levels for






V (µ; s)¡ C (µ; s)
¾
;




fb) = Vs(µ; s
fb), (15)
which says that the marginal cost from schooling and the ?present value? of the mar-













so that the ?rst-best locus in sµ-space is upward-sloping. Since the second derivative
of the locus depends on third derivatives of the functions C (¢; ¢) and V (¢; ¢), the shape
of the FB-locus is generally ambiguous. However, using the speci?cations given in
Example 1, dµ=ds = 2 (®+ r) =®A; in which case the FB-locus is a straight line.
4.2 Minimum signaling pro?le (MS-pro?le)
Based on the discussion provided above, we know that the separating equilibrium








Cs (µ; s) > Vs (µ; s) 8µ > µl. (17)
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Since the LHS of (16) is increasing with s16 and decreasing with °, s
¯
is lower than
the ?rst-best schooling level sfb for the least able type if ° is strictly less than one.
Obviously, this gap in education is the larger the more severe are the search frictions in
the market; i.e. the greater is r: However, separating regime requires that (17) holds
for rest of the types µ > µl so that educational signaling may exceed the ?rst-best
schooling for types above some threshold ¹µ (see Figure 2, Case A). Hence,
Proposition 1 Given that ° < 1; the minimum signaling pro?le (the MS-pro?le)
entails underinvestment in education at least within a range of lower-tail types. Greater
search frictions amplify undereducation.
4.3 Signaling pro?le with the least type investing e¢ciently
(LTE-pro?le)
Consider now a signaling pro?le where the least type chooses his ?rst-best education
while everyone else invests an amount that is enough to separate himself from the
less able colleagues. In traditional competitive equilibrium models (e.g. Spence 1973,
Riley 1979) - or in explicitly game-theoretic models (e.g. Cho-Kreps) - this kind of
practice leads to overinvestment among all other types except the least able type.
This result is known as the ?Riley outcome?. Instead, under decentralized trading and










Cs (µ; s) > Vs (µ; s) 8µ > µl.
Again we have that if ° is su¢ciently low the slope of the signaling pro?le is
steeper than the FB-locus, and the LTE-pro?le exhibits undereducation.
Proposition 2 For su¢ciently low °, the LTE-pro?le induces underinvestment in
education throughout the set £.
This possibility is depicted by the Case B in Figure 2. Note that for intermediate
levels of °; also the LTE-pro?le may induce undereducation only within a subset of
types. Whether this happens among the higher- or lower-tail types depends on the
speci?c forms of the V and C functions.




















Figure 2: Set of ?intuitive? signaling pro?les
4.4 The set of ?intuitive? signaling pro?les
A typical result in the conventional literature is that the LTE-pro?le is the most
?intuitive? regime. This is because, in these models, this type of signaling pattern
happens to coincide with both the MS-pro?le and the Pareto-dominant signaling pro?le
(PD-pro?le). In our case, however, if ° < 1 and when search frictions are non-trivial,
the MS-pro?le induces each type to invest in education strictly less than the LTE-
pro?le does. Moreover, as we will see below, neither of these signaling pro?les are
necessarily Pareto-dominant.
We will argue that signaling pro?les inducing more education than the LTE-
pro?le are not ?intuitive?. Our argument draws from Cho and Krep?s (1987) ?intuitive
criterion? and is based on the assumption that if an employer meets a worker with an
?o¤-equilibrium? signal, s0, that is less than the ?more-than-e¢cient? signal, s¤l > s
fb
l ,
chosen by the least able type in equilibrium, then the employer infers that such a
worker must be of the least type. But then it would be mutually bene?cial if the
least able type deviated for s0 because that would generate extra surplus. ?Intuitive
criterion? then requires that such an opportunity will be exploited. This reasoning can
be continued until the least type invests his ?rst-best level. However, the least type?s
equilibrium signals below the e¢cient level cannot be ruled out by the same argument.
This is because a downward-deviation would lead to a mutually less e¢cient outcome,
while an upward-deviation would make the least type to imitate some higher type,
which, in turn, would violate the condition for optimal schooling determined by the
individual utility maximization. Therefore we have
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Proposition 3 The set of ?intuitive? signaling pro?les consists of pro?les in between
the MS-pro?le and the LTE-pro?le.
Figure 2 illustrates the set of ?intuitive? signaling pro?les under di¤erent market
conditions. Under relatively high ° and moderate search frictions (Case A), the MS-
pro?le entails undereducation for types µ < ¹µ and overeducation for µ > ¹µ, while the
LTE-pro?le generates overeducation throughout the set £. In the opposite case, i.e.,
when workers? share of the matching surplus is relatively low or the search frictions in
the labor market are severe (Case B), both boundary pro?les induce undereducation.
The Case B in Figure 2 also depicts an example where none of the ?intuitive?
pro?les is Pareto-dominant; i.e., a signaling pro?le which minimizes the ine¢ciencies
due under- and overinvestment in education.
Proposition 4 If either ° is su¢ciently low or the search frictions in the labor market
are severe, the PD-pro?le does not belong to the set of ?intuitive? signaling pro?les.
Under the market conditions illustrated by the case B, the second-best signaling
(the PD-pro?le) would induce overeducation among the lower-tail types to mitigate
the undereducation problem among some of the higher types. However, in the Case A,
the PD-pro?le is in the set of ?intuitive? signaling pro?les and the second-best outcome
is feasible.
4.5 ?Riley outcome? as a limiting case
Riley (1979) considered signaling in a ?quasi-competitive? equilibrium model17, which
can be treated as a limiting case of the current setting. Assume that search frictions






which is equivalent to the formula derived by Riley (1979). Social optimum now
requires that each type µ chooses an education level where the marginal cost and mar-
ginal bene?t from schooling balance; i.e., Cs = Vs. In a second-best solution, however,
17Though, he needed to introduce a re?nement to conventional Walrasian equilibrium concept in
order to obtain stability of the separating equilibrium. Riley?s re?nement was ?reactive equilibrium?.
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separating equilibrium requires Cs > Vs. Thus, signaling pro?les that establish sep-
arating equilibrium must entail too much investment in education compared to the
socially e¢cient level. Moreover, when r approaches zero, ° does not a¤ect the shape
of the signaling pro?le so that the MS-pro?le, the LTE-pro?le and the PD-pro?le are
all equal. Hence, the Riley outcome holds as a limiting case.
4.6 Discussion
It was shown above that bilateral trading and search frictions in the labor market
can give rise to ine¢ciently low education levels at least within a subset of types.
Sometimes undereducation counterbalances the ine¢ciencies caused by overeducation,
as depicted by the Case A in Figure 2, but sometimes underinvestment in education
takes place throughout the types (Case B). The latter is the more likely to happen
the weaker is workers? position at the bargaining stage and the more severe are the
search frictions.
Obviously, there would be room for e¢ciency improving policy measures. Let
us ?rst consider market conditions characterized by the Case A. Interestingly, under
these circumstances increasing search frictions (i.e. higher r) would improve e¢ciency
because the set of intuitive signaling pro?les would shift counter-clockwise, leading
to reduced overeducation among the high-types. As a result, the possible signaling
pro?les would come closer to the e¢cient FB-pro?le. This ?nding implies that an
employment service, for example, may in some cases provide ?too e¢cient? coordina-
tion if that practice promotes signi?cant overeducation. Note that an introduction of
income taxes would essentially have the same e¤ect as degenerating search frictions.
Hence, a regulator may be able to improve educational e¢ciency by implementing a
positive income tax system. On the other hand, in Case B, undereducation is the
more prominent problem. Attempts to improve e¢ciency therefore call for schooling
subsidies. The second best (the PD-pro?le), for example, could be implemented by
introducing a schooling subsidy that guarantees free and mandatory education up to
a degree sP D (see the right panel of Figure 2).
Finally, let us elaborate the e¤ect of an exogenous increase in labor productivity
on equilibrium signaling. Let parameter A to represent the general level of technolog-
ical development in the economy. In terms of the MS-pro?le, the e¤ect of improving
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Css ¡ Vss ;
which is increasing in ° if VsA > 0. The e¤ect of better technology on the ?rst-best
education level sfb is given by the same formula with ° = 1. In other words, when
° < 1, the minimum schooling for the least able type increases less in response to
a positive technological shock than in the ?rst-best case. As a result, technological
development tends to amplify undereducation among the least able types. How about
rest of the types? The slope of the signaling pro?le is given by (10). Di¤erentiating












which is a negative number since VµA > 0 and because separating equilibrium requires
°®+r
°®
Cs ¡Vs > 0: Hence, the signaling pro?le becomes ?atter as the general labor pro-
ductivity parameter is increased. From this observation we cannot conclude, however,
that overeducation among the high-types gets worse because also the ?rst-best pro?le
becomes ?atter requiring more education for each type. Instead, we have that
Proposition 5 An exogenous increase in technological knowledge ampli?es undere-
ducation among the low types and compounds the dispersion in education levels and
wages.
The empirically observed increase in ?skill premium? in wages has been claimed
to result from ?skill-biased? technological development. Proposition 5 suggests that a
similar trend can result from ?non-biased? technological change if labor markets are
imperfect.
5 General equilibrium analysis
In this section we analyze general labor market equilibrium by the same token as is
done in Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995), who investigate the e¤ects of human capital
accumulation on market entry and growth. The main purpose of this section is to
examine how the main macroeconomic implications and their economic interpretations
are modi?ed when also the ?signaling hypothesis? is taken into consideration.
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5.1 Entry and exit
It is assumed that new workers are born at an exogenously given and constant rate,
´. From employers? side we assume unrestricted entry. The cost of opening a vacancy
is denoted by Á, which can be thought to capture all the other factors of production
except the worker. Firms will open new vacancies until the expected pro?t from a
?lled vacancy equals the ?xed cost, Á. After a successful match, both the hired worker
and the ?lled vacancy exit the market forever.
5.2 Pairwise matching
The number of unemployed workers is denoted by u while v is our measure for the
number of open vacancies. The matching function, m0M (u; v), gives the total number
of matches at each point of time as a function of two inputs, u and v. Parameter m0
describes the exogenous matching technology.
* Assumption 4: Matching function M : R2+ ! R+ is strictly increasing and
strictly concave, satis?es the Inada-conditions, and exhibits constant returns to
scale (CRS).
In a steady state, pairwise matching requires:
®u = ¯v: (18)
5.3 Steady state equilibrium
De?nition 2 A steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a wage schedule W (s; ®¤)





= Á (free entry)
(ii) ®¤u¤ = ¯¤v¤ = m0M (u¤; v¤) ; (matching condition)
(iii) ®¤u¤ = ´ (steady-state condition).
The pairwise matching condition, together with the CRS-property of the match-









which implicitly de?nes the locus of the ?Beveridge-curve? (the steady state relationship
between un?lled jobs and unemployment) in ®¯-space Utilizing the equilibrium wage














¢ ¡ W ¡g¡1 (µ; ®)¢¤ dF (µ) = Á: (20)
Now, the equations (19) and (20) determine the steady state meeting rates, ®¤ and
¯¤. Since u¤ = ´=®¤ and v¤ = ´=¯¤, the two equations solve the system completely,
and a steady state equilibrium can be found at the intersection of the ?Beveridge-curve?
(BC), and the free-entry curve (FE).
Following immediately from Assumption 4, the locus of the ?Beveridge-curve? is







[Vs ¡ Ws] @g¡1@® dF (µ)
r= (¯ + r)2
: (21)
Lemma 1 The FE-locus exhibits a decreasing segment in ®¯-space, if undereducation
is the prevailing mode in education sector. Correspondingly, the FE-locus is increasing
when overeducation dominates. The slope of the FE-locus is zero at the point where
the ine¢ciencies caused by under- and overeducation balance.
Proof. See Appendix.
By the analysis carried out in the previous section, we know that undereducation
tend to dominate if either ° is su¢ciently low or the search frictions in the labor
market are severe. An example of such a situation was depicted by the Case B in
Figure 2 where undereducation prevails throughout the set £:The level of congestion,
which is the greater the smaller is the meeting rate, a¤ects exactly as the exogenous
friction r. The intuition behind the downward-sloping property of the FE-locus is
that it may not pay to open new vacancies unless workers have su¢cient incentives
to invest in schooling. Undereducation eases o¤ as the congestion on workers? side
of the market is alleviated (i.e. ® becomes larger). This happens when the labor
market becomes ?tighter? (from employers? point of view) so that the ratio between
vacant jobs and unemployed workers is larger. Therefore, even though tight market
conditions typically discourage entry because of the congestion e¤ect on employers?












Figure 3: Unique steady states
because undereducation among workers is reduced. As a result increasing ® may
lead to tougher competition on labor force and higher congestion on employers? side
(lower ¯).18 However, as ® ! 1, it is obvious from (10) that the signaling pro?le
approaches the ?Riley outcome? so that overeducation prevails throughout the set £
and the FE-locus becomes monotonously increasing. Therefore, we may conclude that
the FE-locus necessarily turns increasing after some threshold level for ®, say ®h. If
®h > 0, then the FE-locus exhibits a downward-sloping segment within the interval
® 2 [0; ®h].
Figure 3 illustrates the two cases: Firstly, when workers? private return from
schooling is relatively high, i.e., when ° is large enough, overeducation is the most
dominant feature and employers? free-entry curve is monotonously increasing in ®¯-
space (the left panel). Secondly, when ° is low, undereducation dominates under
?slack? labor market conditions and the FE-locus exhibits a decreasing segment (the
right panel).
5.4 Multiple equilibria
For multiple equilibria to arise, the downward-sloping property of the free-entry locus
is a necessary19 precondition. Obviously, the labor market is the more likely to exhibit
multiple steady state equilibria the steeper is the decreasing segment of the FE-locus
18This is essentially the same intuition as in the model by Laing et al.?s (1995). However, they do
not justify the shape of the free-entry locus analytically.

















Figure 4: Multiple equilibria and escaping ?development trap?
and the higher is the threshold ®h. Since a decrease in workers? bargaining power
ampli?es undereducation, multiplicity of steady states may result from an exogenous
drop in °. Moreover, Proposition 5 suggests that an improvement in technological
development tend to compound underinvestment in education at least among the
lower-tail types. The left panel of Figure 4 provides a tentative sketch of a possible
outcome from lowering ° and/or increasing A. The reason why the free-entry curve
is drawn to also shift down is that lower ° enlarges employers? share of the matching
surplus which encourages market entry.
Since the steady state unemployment and vacancies can be expressed as u¤ = ´=®¤
and v¤ = ´=¯¤ respectively, the ?rst steady state, E1; is characterized by high equi-
librium unemployment, severe undereducation, and low market entry by ?rms. Under
steady state E2; in turn, there are more open vacancies, less unemployment, and better
educated workers than in E1. Steady state E1 can be interpreted as a development
trap that can arise as a coordination failure in a decentralized economy: Workers are
stuck at undereducation because private returns from educational investments remain
low due scarce working opportunities in the labor market. Employers, in turn, are
reluctant to open new vacancies due to poor educational level of labor force.
The policy measures proposed in Section 4.6 could be used to eliminate undere-
ducation problem, which is the fundamental source of the potential indeterminacy of
steady states. Moreover, reminiscent of the results by Laing et al. (1995), the right
panel of Figure 4 suggests that even small improvements in market infrastructure, m0,
may help the economy to escape the development trap. For example, better coordi-
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nation in public employment service can initiate a considerable leap from an inferior
high-unemployment steady state (E1) to a unique steady state with lower unemploy-
ment (E2). As noted by Laing et al., such a ?take-o¤? can be interpreted as an example
of Murphy?s et. al (1991) ?big push? development, where potentially small improve-
ments in economic infrastructure may ?push? the economy from ?cottage?-production
to industrialization.
6 Concluding remarks
According to the traditional job market signaling literature, e.g. Spence (1973, 1974)
and Riley (1979), signaling motive tends to induce overinvestment in education. The
current model deviates from the previous literature by considering imperfect labor
markets characterized by decentralized trading and search frictions. It turns out that,
as the division of the gains from trading is determined according to a bargaining
game, the private return from schooling available for workers may not be high enough
to guarantee su¢cient investment in education. Instead, undereducation may arise at
least within a subset of types. Workers? lower ?bargaining power?, as well as greater
search frictions, tend to amplify underinvestment. As search frictions become in?ni-
tesimal, the ?Riley outcome? with all types except the least able worker overinvesting
in schooling emerges as a limiting case.
As a theoretical notice, we emphasize that our model with decentralized trading
does not su¤er from the instability problems characteristic to Walrasian analysis. The
equilibrium signaling pro?le, however, is typically not unique, but the set of ?intuitive?
signaling pro?les can be identi?ed. This set consists of pro?les between the ?minimum
signaling pro?le? (the MS-pro?le) and the pro?le that induces the least type to invest
e¢ciently (the LTE-pro?le). We also note that the Pareto-dominant signaling pro?le
- the pro?le that minimizes ine¢ciencies caused by under- and overinvestment - is
not necessarily ?intuitive?, implying that not even the second-best is always feasible.
However, the regulator can improve e¢ciency by introducing either income taxation
(if overeducation is the more prominent problem) or schooling subsidies (when under-
education dominates).
Our model also predicts that technological progress is likely to worsen undered-
ucation among the low types and thereby compound the dispersion in both education
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levels and wages. This ?nding suggests that widening inequality in wage structure may
result from ?ordinary? technological development that is not distinctively ?skill-biased?.
On the market level, we ?nd that underinvestment in schooling may hinder job
creation when labor market is ?slack?. Even though workers? increasing likelihood to
be matched generally weakens ?rms? position in wage negotiations, it also alleviates
undereducation. Therefore, it is possible that higher contact rate on workers? side
actually stimulates market entry by ?rms. This feature may give rise to multiple
steady state equilibria. One of the steady states can be interpreted as a development
trap characterized by high unemployment and severe undereducation. Reminiscent of
the model by Laing et al. (1995), the model may feature a possibility of ?Big Push?
development; i.e., even small improvements in labor market?s matching e¢ciency may
help the economy to escape the development trap for a unique and more e¢cient
steady state equilibrium.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1






[Vs ¡ Ws] @g¡1@® dF (µ)
r= (¯ + r)2
:
Since the denominator is positive, the sign of d¯=d® is determined by the numerator.
Firstly, the partial derivative @g¡1=@® tells how the education levels react when ® is
increased. Since greater ® means less frictions in locating potential employers, higher
® should increase workers? private return from schooling both because their position in
wage bargaining is improved through more valuable ?disagreement-option? and because
the ?rst contact in the labour market is more readily available. Indeed, from (10) we






and @g¡1 (s; ¢) =@® > 0. Secondly, Vs ¡ Ws gives the di¤erence between the marginal
e¤ect of education on output and equilibrium wage. Equations (13) and (15) directly
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so that Vs ¡ Ws = 0 and the slope of the FE-curve is zero. Since C is convex and V
concave in s,
Vs > Ws;
implies undereducation. However, the integral over all types is positive only if under-
education holds for su¢ciently large number of types. This is the case for example in
Case B, where undereducation prevails throughout the set £:
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Asymmetric information in credit
markets and entrepreneurial risk taking
Abstract
The paper constructs a search-theoretic model of credit markets with bilat-
eral trading under asymmetric information. Borrowers? success probabilities are
unobservable to the ?nanciers, but the observable project riskiness functions as
a signaling device. We ?nd that the e¢ciency of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
depends negatively (positively) on the credit market ?tightness? (liquidity). If
greater credit market tightness is interpreted as less intense competition among
?nanciers, the commonly held view of a negative relationship between ?nancial
competition and average project quality does not emerge in our set-up.
We also ?nd that lower search frictions tend to increase the probability of
adverse selection so that a trade-o¤ between total volume of trading and e¢cient
project selection may arise. This general trade-o¤ does not, however, necessarily
imply that there would be adverse selection in the competitive limit. That
depends crucially on the index of credit market tightness and the distribution
of types.
1 Introduction
The paper considers trading between ?nanciers and entrepreneurs in a credit market
with asymmetric information. The market?s microstructure is characterized by search
frictions and decentralized (pairwise) trading: loan prices are determined and transac-
tions concluded in private meetings between entrepreneurs and ?nanciers. Financiers
are homogenous and generic; a ?nancier can be interpreted as an individual investor,
venture capitalist, or a ?nancial institution such as bank. All entrepreneurs have ac-
cess to either a ?risky? or a ?safe? investment. The characteristic of the project will
be observed by the ?nancier, but the success probability of a risky project depends
on entrepreneur?s unobservable ability. Entrepreneurs are of two types, high and low
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ability. The sequence of moves is as follows: Entrepreneurs with hidden types ?rst
choose either a ?risky? or a ?safe? project and then, after writing up the business plan,
start seeking ?nance for the chosen project. E¢cient project selection takes place un-
der a separating regime where the low-type chooses a safe project while the high type
goes for a risky investment. Upon a meeting between an entrepreneur and a ?nancier,
the ?nancier proposes a loan contract o¤er based on the project?s characteristics and
his beliefs on the type of the entrepreneur. Therefore, the observable project riskiness
serves as a signal of the unobservable success probability1.
Our construction di¤ers from the conventional models of credit market with asym-
metric information (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, and de Meza and Webb, 1987) with
two important respects: Firstly, ?nanciers can distinguish between ?risky? and ?safe?
projects but not whether the entrepreneur has high or low success probability in risky
investments. As a result, the e¢ciency of trading is driven by entrepreneurs? self-
selection among the business opportunities2. Secondly, price formation is decentralized
and movement from one trading opportunity to another is restricted by search fric-
tions. The model features also a theoretical contribution that stems form the way the
pairwise bargaining under asymmetric information is treated3. The well-known com-
plexities related to asymmetric information in Rubinstein?s (1982) strategic bargaining
game4 are avoided by assuming that only the uninformed party, i.e. the ?nancier, is
allowed to make o¤ers in a take-it-or-leave-it manner. However, borrowers are as-
sumed to have an option to continue search meanwhile negotiating with the ?nancier.
If the borrower exercised this option and managed to locate another ?nancier, the
two competing ?nanciers would bid for the right to ?nance the entrepreneur?s project.
1In this sense, the setting resembles the models where collateral can be used as a sorting device
(e.g. Wette (1983) and Bester (1985, 1987)). The set-up can also be interpreted as an ex ante-stage
moral hazard model.
2Kanniainen and Leppämäki (2002) address the question how people with di¤erent talents get
allocated to various projects under di¤erent ?nancial institutions. Takalo and Toivanen (2003) also
discuss adverse selection problem in ?nancial markets via occupational choice between starting as an
entrepreneur or a ?nancier
3Inderst (2001) provides an interesting analysis on bargaining with asymmetric information in a
bilateral matching model. However, his model is simpli?ed by the assumption that principal?s payo¤
is independent of the agent?s type. Also Bester (1988) studies bargaining in a search model, where
di¤erences between sellers? types create price dispersions, but he does not consider adverse selection.
4See for example Muthoo (1999, ch. 9.8) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch. 10.4)
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The proposed deviations from the standard literature seem meaningful, because pair-
wise trading is a common mode of interaction in credit markets and its unlikely that
entrepreneurs would be bound to uniform investment opportunities. The upcoming
analysis demonstrates that our setting provides new economic insight into the e¢-
ciency of resource allocation. Our search-theoretic approach also allows us to de?ne
?taxonomy? of market conditions and discuss how these underlying conditions - like
market liquidity or the frequency of ?nancial matchmaking (which can be thought to
depend on the sophistication of ?nancial institutions) - a¤ect allocative e¢ciency.
There will be four possible regimes governing the allocation of ?nancial resources.
The ?rst one is the separating equilibrium (SE) where each type chooses e¢ciently.
Another equilibrium in pure-strategies the pooling equilibrium I (PEI) where both
types choose a risky project so that there is adverse selection by the low-type. As an
intermediate case we have the semi-separating equilibrium (SSE) where the high-type
again selects e¢ciently but the low-type deviates from the e¢cient regime with some
probability. There is also the pooling equilibrium II (PEII) where both types stick
to safe projects; i.e., there is adverse selection by the high-type. It is shown that the
e¢cient separating equilibrium exists only under su¢ciently ?liquid? market conditions
which is the case when the number of ?nanciers in the credit market is large enough
compared to the number of loan applicants. Better market liquidity increases the
rate at which a competing ?nancier can be located, which unambiguously improves
entrepreneurs? ?bargaining power?. As a result, entrepreneurs? private return from ?-
nancial matching comes closer to the available social return so that entrepreneurs face
greater incentives to select projects e¢ciently. Correspondingly, the regimes where the
low-type chooses ine¢ciently can emerge only under su¢ciently ?tight? (i.e. illiquid)
market conditions. The gains available for ?low ability? entrepreneurs from safe invest-
ments decrease along with greater credit market tightness - which enhances ?nanciers?
market power - more rapidly than the gains available from risky investments. This is
because entrepreneurs with high success probability in risky projects ?cross-subsidize?
the borrowers with low success rate. Although the regime where the high-types select
ine¢ciently, the PEII , can under some parameter values exist globally, it is generally
more likely to prevail only under su¢ciently illiquid markets. Hence, credit market
tightness may give rise to either extreme over- or underinvestment in risky projects.
Our results somewhat contradicts with those of Becsi, Li and Wang (2003) who
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also develop a model of ??nancial matching?5 with heterogeneous borrowers (they do
not discuss informational asymmetries, however). Becsi et al. endogenize market entry
by borrowers and conclude that greater credit market tightness discourages low-quality
borrowers disproportionately, leading to higher average quality of projects. Moreover,
greater credit market tightness can, in a sense, be interpreted as less intense competi-
tion on scarce ?nancing projects. According such interpretation, our result contradicts
with the commonly held view that ?nancial sector competition is likely to induce risk
taking and thereby ?nancial fragility.6 ;7. In this branch of literature, only a few papers
consider the e¤ect of competition on adverse selection problem. Broecker (1990) ana-
lyzes this issue and concludes that intensi?ed competition among ?nanciers is likely to
worsen adverse selection because borrowers whose loan applications have been rejected
at one place can stay in the market and apply for loans from competing ?nanciers.
As a result, the average quality of loan applicants decreases along with more intense
competition.8 However, as in our model the emphasis is shifted on the entrepreneurs?
5Financial matching has also been studied by Wasmer and Weil (2000) and Diamond (1990).
Wasmer and Weil investigate the interaction between labor and credit market imperfections as a
potential explanation why European and the US unemployment di¤er so greatly. Diamond, in turn,
focuses on comparing lumpy and smooth credit supply in a search equilibrium.
6In his highly in?uential paper, Keeley (1990) claimed that the peak in bank failures in the US
during the 1980?s was caused by banking sector deregulation that spurred competition and reduced
monopoly rents. The reason for excessive risk taking was that the reduction in the banks? ?charter
value? magni?ed the agency problem between bank owners and deposit insurance fund. In the face
of lower mark-ups, bank owners have greater incentive to increase upside potential via excess risk
taking because limited liability and deposit insurance deaden the downside risks.
Theoretical results similar to Keeley?s argument were derived by Besanko and Thakor (1993), Boot
and Greenbaum (1993) and Erwards and Mishkin (1995). There are also a host of papers investigating
how competition on deposits a¤ects banks? risk taking (e.g. Nagarajan and Sealey, 1995, Matutes and
Vives, 2000, Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000, Perotti and Suarez, 2002, and Cordella and Yeyati,
2002, and Caminal and Matutes, 2002), most of which produce a trade-o¤ between competition and
excess risk taking. However, Nagarajan and Sealey (1995) and Caminal and Matutes (2002) construct
examples where the converse is true.
7The empirical literature (e.g. Keeley, 1990, and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003) investi-
gating the relationship between banking competition and ?nancial stability does not o¤er a clear-cut
evidence in either direction and the results seem highly case dependent. Carletti and Hartmann
(2003) and Allen and Gale (2003) provide excellent surveys of the literature.
8Some authors, like Cetorelli and Peretto (2000), emphasize ?nanciers critical role in screening
entrepreneurial projects. They ?nd that banking competition exacerbates adverse selection because
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active role in project selection, higher private returns encourage e¢cient selection and
the adverse relationship between ?nancial competition and average project quality
does not emerge.9
Regarding the role of search frictions in the market, we ?nd that lower frictions
tend to increase, ceteris paribus, the probability of adverse selection. Financiers? ??rst-
mover advantage? upon meetings dilutes along with greater matching rates, which
increases the utility available from risky projects disproportionately. Consequently,
risky investments become relatively more attractive than safe projects. Therefore,
our model produces a trade-o¤ between the total volume of trading and the average
quality of investments along with lower search frictions. In Becsi et al.?s (2003) model
such a trade-o¤ arises as a result of greater market liquidity. As the search frictions
become in?nitesimal, each agent has an immediate access to any trading opportunity
in the market so that we obtain competitive equilibrium - the framework of the models
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and Webb (1987) - as a limiting case. The
general trade-o¤ between quality and quantity along with more e¢cient matching
does not, however, necessarily imply that there would be adverse selection in the
competitive limit. Which allocative regime is in e¤ect depends primarily on the market
tightness and on the distribution of types. If one considers, for example, the symmetric
case where the number of entrepreneurs and ?nanciers in the market is roughly the
same, i.e., there is no excess demand nor excess supply, e¢cient allocation exists if the
fraction of the high-type borrowers is su¢ciently small. This is because higher relative
number of high-types reinforces the cross-subsidization e¤ect and the low-types are
more likely to deviate in favor of less e¢cient project selection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model setup, de?nes
the taxonomy of market conditions and describes the formation of loan prices. Section
3 discusses the possible regimes that govern resource allocation in credit markets.
Section 4 concludes.
competitive banks face less incentive to exert costly project evaluation due potential free-riding.
9Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) conclude in a model with endogenous investment volumes that
loan market competition reduces lending rates and generates higher investments without increasing
the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers.
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2 The model setup
2.1 Economic agents
There are two types of risk-neutral agents operating in the credit market: entrepre-
neurs and ?nanciers. Entrepreneurs have access to investment opportunities whose
implementation requires external ?nance. Financiers, in turn, possess access to ?-
nancial resources. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that it takes exactly one
entrepreneur and one ?nancier to form a ?nancial relationship.
Financiers are homogenous and generic: a ?nancier can be interpreted as an
individual investor or a ?nancial institution such as bank. Entrepreneurs di¤er in
their type µ 2 £ = fµL; µHg ; which is unobservable to the ?nancier. It is common
knowledge that entrepreneur can be either ?high-type? (µH) or ?low-type? (µL) with
respective probabilities ¸ (µH) = ¹¸ and ¸ (µL) = 1¡ ¹¸.
Each entrepreneur has access to either ?risky? (!¾) or ?safe? (!s)10 project. Before
meeting with a ?nancier, entrepreneurs must commit to the business plan for which
they are seeking ?nance. It is assumed that ?nanciers can observe whether the chosen
project is ?safe? or ?risky?, and that they are able to monitor the implementation of
the chosen project; i.e. there is no moral hazard in the model like for example in
Holmstöm and Tirole (1997).
Regardless of the type of the entrepreneur, safe projects produce a constant and








where ws is the return on safe investment at every instant and r is the risk-free interest
rate, which also serves as the common discount rate of the economy.
When successful, a risky project generates a perpetual ?ow of output w¾ normal-
ized to one; i.e. W¾ = 1=r. However, if a risky investment fails, it produces no output.
In that case, due limited liability, the ?nancier takes the credit loss and becomes ?idle?
while the entrepreneur leaves the credit market forever. Whether the risky project
succeeds or fails is revealed immediately after the investment.
10The ?less risky? project is treated as ?safe? investment for simplicity.
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Figure 1: Sequence of events
If a high-type (low-type) entrepreneur chooses !¾, she will succeed with proba-
bility pH (pL) and fail with the complementary probability 1¡ pH (1¡ pL). Thus, the
present value of the expected output from a risky project reads as pi=r; i = H; L. The
success probabilities pi are common knowledge.
Any new start-up requires ?nancial resources equal to a constant amount, K. If
K units of capital were invested elsewhere in the ?nancial markets, ?nanciers could
obtain a ?ow of rental earnings b, the discounted value of which is b=r.
* Assumption 1
(i) pH > pL;
(ii) pH > ws > pL; ws > b.
Hence, type-µH is a ?better? manager for a risky project than type-µL in a ?rst-
order stochastic dominance sense. Assumption 1 implies that, in a social optimum,
type-µH should choose a risky project while type-µL should stick to a safe project.
Reminiscent of the models where collateral is used as a sorting device, e.g. Wette
(1983) and Bester (1985, 1987), the riskiness of the chosen project can be thought to
give a signal of the entrepreneur?s innate type. Due to the sequential structure of the
model (as depicted in Figure 1) a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) will be used as
a solution concept.
53
2.2 Utilities from ?nancial contracting
The general form of the ?nancial contract is standard debt, because debt ?nance can
be shown to be the equilibrium method of ?nance under Assumption 111. Therefore,
the present value of the expected utility that an entrepreneur of type-µi gets from a





where R¾ is the interest rate charged by the ?nancier in the case of a risky investment.





where Rs is the interest rate charged in the case of a safe project.






However, since entrepreneurs? types are their private information, the expected





where the ?average? success probability »; pL · » · pH ; re?ects the fact that the risky
project may be managed by either a type-µH or a type-µL. Let us denote by ¹ (!¾)
the ?nancier?s posterior belief on probability that the risky project is carried out by
a high-type entrepreneur. Then we have
» = ¹ (!¾) pH + (1¡ ¹ (!¾)) pL: (5)
As in the model by de Meza and Webb (1987), there is cross-subsidization between
the types. Since ?nanciers make loan price o¤ers for risky investments based on
their posterior beliefs, type-µH with ?higher-than-average? success rate su¤ers while
the type-µL with ?lower-than-average? success rate gains.
11The formal proof can be found in de Meza and Webb (1987). The intuition behind this result is
that entrepreneurs with higher success probability than the average success rate, p^, prefer to issues
debt while entrepreneurs with lower than average success probability would prefer equity. Therefore,
?nanciers cannot gain by o¤ering to buy equity.
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2.3 Search and matching
Unlike in the conventional Walrasian analysis, trading in the credit market is decen-
tralized and carried out in an uncoordinated manner. Search for a trading partner is
costless but time-consuming, which creates a friction in the functioning of the mar-
ket12. Moreover, the matching process is random in a sense that each individual has
an equal chance of locating a trading partner.
Since we utilize continuous-time framework, matching rates can be represented
by Poisson ?ow probabilities. The contact rate of an unmatched entrepreneur with a
?nancier is denoted by ® while ?nanciers locate entrepreneurs at rate ¯: The number
of entrepreneurs seeking ?nance is denoted by E and the number of ?nanciers by
F: The pairwise matching condition, ®E = ¯F , manifests the fact that exactly one
entrepreneur and one ?nancier is needed to establish a successful match. We follow
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) by assuming that there are exogenous and constant
?ows of arrival at the rates of e new entrepreneurs and e new ?nanciers at each point of
time13. Thus, the model will deal with a steady state situation in which the measures
E and F are constant over time14.
The ratio ' = E=F (= ¯=®) measures credit market tightness. If ' is high,
credit market is ?tight? since there is a large number of entrepreneurs seeking ?nance
per each ?vacant lot? of loan capital. Equivalently, 1=' is an index of the liquidity of
the credit market15: If ' is low, there is relatively large supply of credit compared to
the demand and thereby ?nance is more readily available. Note that the meeting rates
® and ¯ are interlinked; in steady state, ¯ = '®. Therefore we may say that, if ® is
low the matching e¢ciency of the credit market is poor, while in the opposite case,
search frictions are moderate and matching is relatively e¢cient. Figure 2 illustrates
the interpretation of the ®¯-plane in credit market context.
12Having direct search costs would introduce just another friction to the matching process.
13These rates must be equal to ensure the existence of a steady state.
14This type of setting is a simpli?ed version of the conventional Mortensen-Pissarides framework
(Mortensen, 1982, and Pissarides, 1984, 2000) in which these numbers are typically determined by a
free-entry condition and an exogenous ?matching function?.










Figure 2: Taxonomy of market conditions
2.4 Price formation
Upon meeting, the ?nancier makes a loan contract o¤er in a take-it-or-leave-it man-
ner. However, before accepting or rejecting the o¤er, the entrepreneur has an option
to continue search for another ?nancier. If another ?nancier shows up, the two lender
candidates must engage in a Bertrand-type price competition. As a result, the com-
peting ?nanciers lower their credit rate o¤ers until driven to their reservation utility
levels, V016.
Thus, when there are two ?nanciers at the meeting, the competitive loan prices
are set on a level that, given the equilibrium beliefs ¹¤ (!¾), produces the entrepreneur




¡ V0 (Rs; R¾) ; (6)




¡ V0 (Rs; R¾) ; (7)
when a safe project has been chosen.
16A more general treatment of this type of negotiation procedure can be found in Kultti and
Virrankoski (2004).
17Again in present value terms.
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Note that » ¡ b (ws ¡ b) represents the expected total surplus available from a
risky (safe) investment. Thus, equations (6) and (7) simply state that the expected
gain from trade for an entrepreneur facing two competing ?nanciers equals the net of
the expected total surplus and lenders? reservation utility, V0.
In order to derive the formula describing V0, let us denote by ¿ (1 ¡ ¿) the
probability that the ?next? project to be met is risky (safe). As ?nanciers locate
entrepreneurs at rate, V0 can be determined by the following asset pricing formula:
rV0 (Rs; R¾) = ¯ f(¿V¾ (R¾) + (1¡ ¿ )Vs (Rs))¡ V0 (Rs; R¾)g ;
which directly implies that
V0 (Rs; R¾) =
¯
¯ + r
(¿V¾ (R¾) + (1¡ ¿ )Vs (Rs)) : (8)
Upon every meeting, the entrepreneur - with either a safe or a risky investment
opportunity - faces an option to continue search. Let us denote the respective values
of those options by P^¾ and Ps. Since entrepreneurs locate ?nanciers at rate ®, the




U^ comp¾ ; and Ps =
®
® + r
U comps : (9)
Since ?nanciers can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, a pro?t maximizing lender
proposes an o¤er that just prevents the entrepreneur from exercising her continuation
option18. Thus, the ?nancier sets the loan prices in a manner that guarantees the
entrepreneur with a risky project an average utility equal to






¡ V0 (Rs; R¾)
¶
; (10)
while the utility available for entrepreneurs with safe projects reads as






¡ V0 (Rs; R¾)
¶
: (11)
In the trading process characterized by equations (6)-(11) entrepreneurs possess
an option to continue search while ?nanciers do not. This asymmetry facilitates our
wish to let only the uninformed party to propose o¤ers and, at the same time, provide
18Kultti and Virrankoski (2003) provide a rigorous proof for the fact that no continuation options
are exercised in equilibrium.
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some market power to the informed party as well. The assumptions needed to justify
such an asymmetric structure are: 1) In order to maintain the contact with the entre-
preneur, ?nancier must propose an o¤er upon the meeting, 2) Once the entrepreneur
has received the o¤er, it remains valid until she has either accepted or rejected it, and
3) All loan contract o¤ers are enforceable; i.e. they obligate banks to provide ?nance
at the proposed interest rate. Fortunately, these assumptions are somewhat weak and
plausible.
Equations (10) and (11) implicitly de?ne the loan prices R¾ and Rs respectively.
Lemma 1 gives the explicit expressions for the pricing rule, fRs; R¾g and the utility
levels U^¾ and Us.
Lemma 1
Rs =
(® + r) (¯ + r)ws + ® (® + r) b+ ¿®¯ (» ¡ ws)
(® + r) (® + ¯ + r)
;
R¾ =
(® + r) (¯ + r) » + ® (®+ r) b ¡ ¿®¯ (» ¡ ws)




® ((® + r) (ws ¡ b)¡ ¿¯ (» ¡ ws))
(® + r) (® + ¯ + r) r
;
U^¾ =
® ((® + r) (» ¡ b) + ¿¯ (» ¡ ws))
(® + r) (® + ¯ + r) r
:
Proof. Follows directly from (11) and (10).
Corollary 1 UH¾ =
pH
»




Proof. Follows after few steps from (11) and from (10), and Lemma 1.
The contact rates ® and ¯ a¤ect the share of the surplus available to each trading
partner. In steady state, ® and ¯ = '®: Substituting this fact into the loan price
equations and combining terms gives
Rs =




® + '®+ r
;
R¾ =
(¯ + r) » + ®b ¡ ¿' ®2
®+r
(» ¡ ws)
» (®+ ¯ + r)
;
Di¤erentiating these expressions w.r.t. the index of market tightness, ', obtains
Lemma 2 Greater credit market tightness leads to higher equilibrium loan prices.
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This rather obvious result stems from the fact that increased market tightness
reduces the frequency at which entrepreneurs locate a competing ?nancier, leading to
an unambiguous improvement in ?nanciers? bargaining power.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 De?nition of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
A strategy for an entrepreneur of type-µi prescribes a probability distribution f1¡ ´; ´g
over actions in the set © = f!s; !¾g, given that ?nanciers make loan contract o¤ers
according to the pricing rule expressed in Lemma 1. Thus, the strategy pro?le of
type-µi gives the probability ´ (1 ¡ ´) with which a risky (safe) project, !¾ (!s), is
chosen. Financiers, who observe the entrepreneur?s choice from the set ©, use Bayes?
rule to update their beliefs and to obtain the posterior distribution ¹ (!) over the set
£. Formally,
De?nition 1 An perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is an entrepreneur?s strategy
pro?le f1¡ ´¤i ; ´¤i g ; i; j = H;L and ?nancier?s posterior beliefs ¹¤ (!) such that
(i) ´¤i 2 arg max
´i2[0;1]
©
(1¡ ´i)Us(R¾(´i; ´¤j)) + ´iU i¾(Rs(´i; ´¤j ))
ª
;
and (ii) ?nanciers propose o¤ers, Rs(´¤i ; ´
¤




j ); according to Lemma 1,
and





¸ (µj) ´¤j (!)










j (!) = 0;
then ¹¤ (!) is any probability distribution on £.
By condition (i) in De?nition 1, the equilibrium strategies yield
f1¡ ´¤i ; ´¤i g = f0; 1g , 8´¤j : U i¾(Rs(´¤i ; ´¤j )) > Us(Rs(´¤i ; ´¤j)) and
f1¡ ´¤i ; ´¤i g = f1; 0g , 8´¤j : U i¾(Rs(´¤i ; ´¤j )) < Us(Rs(´¤i ; ´¤j)).
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On the other hand, a regime where type-µi randomizes her choice over the set ©, i.e.









j)); 8´¤j . (12)
Condition (ii) states that the price formation is carried through the procedure
described in Sections 2.4, and that ?nanciers are actually willing to propose o¤ers
according to that pricing rule. Since any loan contract will produce the ?nancier a
payo¤ that at least equals his reservation value, and since this reservation value (in
expected terms) can be shown to be positive under any credit market equilibria, the
latter condition is automatically satis?ed.





1¡ ¹¸¢ ´¤L ; and ¹ (!s) =
¹¸ (1¡ ´¤H)
¹¸ (1¡ ´¤H) +
¡
1¡ ¹¸¢ (1¡ ´¤L)
Moreover,
¿ = ¹¸´¤H +
¡
1¡ ¹¸¢ ´¤L;
It is easy to check that under symmetric information, when the loan contracts
can be conditioned directly upon entrepreneurs? types, the model produces a pricing
rule that induces each type to choose e¢ciently from the set ©. The next section
discusses possible credit market equilibria under asymmetric information.
3.2 Candidate regimes
Lemma 3 (i) Type-µH plays pure strategies by choosing either a safe project or a risky
investment with probability 1; i.e. either ´¤H = 0 or ´
¤
H = 1: (ii) Type-µH chooses a
risky project with probability 1 if type-µL either chooses a risky project with probability
1 or randomizes her choice; i.e. ´¤H = 1 i¤ ´
¤
L 2 (0; 1] :
Proof. (i) Assume the contrary, i.e. ´¤H 2 (0; 1) ; which implies UH¾ = Us. Since
UH¾ > U
L
¾ ; we must have U
L
¾ < Us, which in turn implies ´
¤
L = 0 so that ¿ = ¹¸´
¤
H and
» = pH : But then by Lemma 1, the indi¤erence condition UH¾ = Us is satis?ed only if
pH = ws; which contradicts with assumption pH > ws.
(ii) If ´¤L 2 (0; 1], then UL¾ ¸ Us and UH¾ > Us, which implies ´¤H = 1.
Hence, up to four di¤erent type of equilibria are possible.
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² Separating equilibrium (SE) (?rst-best), where entrepreneurs of type-µH choose
risky projects with probability 1, and entrepreneurs of type-µL choose safe projects
with probability 1,
² Pooling equilibrium I (PE I), where both types choose risky projects with prob-
ability 1,
² Semi-separating equilibrium (SSE), where type-µH chooses a risky project with
probability 1 while type-µL randomizes between risky and safe projects, and
² Pooling equilibrium II (PE II), where both types stick to safe projects with prob-
ability 1.
We will start the equilibrium analysis with the ?rst three regimes. In fact, SE
and PEI are special cases of SSE. After that, existence of the fourth possibility, PEII ,
is discussed separately.
3.3 Existence of SE, PEI and SSE
In a SSE, we have ´¤H = 1 and ´
¤












1¡ ¹¸¢ ´¤L : (13)




(pH ¡ ws)Ã¯ ¡ (®+ r) [pH (ws ¡ pL)¡ (pH ¡ pL) b]
(ws ¡ pL)Ã¯ + (® + r) pL (ws ¡ pL) ; (14)
where Ã = ¹¸pH +
¡
1¡ ¹¸¢ pL.
Proposition 1 (i) Separating equilibrium (SE), i.e ´¤H = 1 and ´
¤
L = 0; is exists, if
´L derived in (14) is non-positive. ´L · 0 if
¯ · pH (ws ¡ pL)¡ (pH ¡ pL) b
(pH ¡ ws)Ã (® + r) ´
^¯SE (®) :
(ii) Pooling equilibrium I (PEI), i.e ´¤H = 1 and ´
¤
L = 1; exists, if ´L ¸ 1, which is the
case if
¯ ¸ Ã (ws ¡ b)¡ pL (Ã ¡ b)
Ã (Ã ¡ ws) (®+ r) ´









Figure 3: Location of di¤erent regimes on ®¯-plane




^¯SE (®) < ¯ < ^¯
PEI
(®) :
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 3 illustrates the information provided by Proposition 1; i.e., the prevalence
of di¤erent regimes in ®¯-plane. The ?iso-strategy? lines, i.e. the locuses that depict
the combinations of ® and ¯ which support the same equilibrium strategies, are linear
and increasing. Credit market tightness, ', increases as one moves counter-clockwise in
Figure 3. Obviously, an increase in ' - which strenghtens ?nanciers? ?bargaining power?
- tends to induce ine¢ciency by encouraging the ?low-types? to choose risky projects.
The reason is that the gains available from safe investments for type-µL entrepreneurs
decrease more rapidly along with ?nanciers? market power than the gains from risky
projects. This is because the ?low-types? bene?t from the cross-subsidization by the
entrepreneurs with high success probability. The negative relationship between market
tightness and allocative e¢ciency is easy to verify by substituting ¯ = '® into (14) and
di¤erentiating w.r.t. the index of credit market tightness, '. It is also straight-forward
to show that, when the fraction of the high-types, ¹¸, is increased, the ?low-types? are
the more likely to deviate in favor of less e¢cient project selection. This is because
the low-types enjoy greater cross-subsidization in risky projects when ¹¸ is larger.
Since in steady state ¯ = '®, ® can be used as a general measure of search fric-
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tions in the market. Interestingly, lower search frictions tend to increase the probabil-
ity of adverse selection. Better matching frequency generally improves entrepreneurs
position by diluting ?nanciers? ?rst-mover advantage and increasing the value of the
option to continue search for a competing ?nancier. However, these improvements
reduce the loan prices for risky investments disproportionately, which unambiguously
increases the threat of adverse selection. This asymmetry is easy to see if the expected






1 + '+ r
®
¡ ¿' (» ¡ ws)¡











1 + '+ r
®
+
¿ (» ¡ ws)¡






Clearly, better matching e¢ciency increases entrepreneurs? expected utility from risky
projects (U^¾), while the e¤ect on the utility available form safe investments (Us) is
ambiguous. Hence, even though greater search frictions hinder ?nancial matchmaking
and thereby reduce the total volume of trading, they may also - at least under some
circumstances - improve allocative e¢ciency.











Proof. Follows directly from di¤erentiating (14) w.r.t. '; ® and ¹¸.
As ® approaches in?nity, search frictions become in?nitesimal. Therefore, a Wal-
rasian competitive equilibrium, where each market participant has frictionless access
to any trading opportunity, can be thought as a limiting case of the current model.
Does the result @´¤L=@® > 0 imply that there will inevitably be adverse selection in
the Walrasian limit? Not necessarily, since lim®!1 ´L may converge to a negative
number, which, by de?nition, means that ´¤L = 0 and we have the e¢cient separating
equilibrium. Whether this actually happens depends crucially on the index of market
tightness and the distribution of types. If one considers the symmetric case where
there is no excess demand nor excess supply, i.e., ' = 1, e¢cient allocation is ob-
tained in the Walrasian limit if the 45-degree line eventually is in the SE-region as the
matching e¢ciency is improved; i.e. one moves further from the origin in Figure 3.
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This will be the case if the slope of the frontier ^¯
SE
(®) is greater than one. In order
to have a su¢ciently steep slope for the frontier ^¯
SE
(®), the fraction of the high-type
borrowers is small enough; i.e.
Lemma 5 Under unit market tighness, ' = 1, SE remains feasible in the Walrasian
limit i¤
¹¸ · pH (ws ¡ pL)¡ (pH ¡ pL) b ¡ pL (pH ¡ ws)
(pH ¡ pL) (pH ¡ ws) :
Proof. Requiring that the slope of the frontier ^¯
SE
(®) is greater than one, i.e.
pH (ws ¡ pL)¡ (pH ¡ pL) b
(pH ¡ ws)Ã > 1;
and remembering that Ã = ¹¸pH +
¡
1¡ ¹¸¢ pL yields the result.
Otherwise our model produces ?overinvestment? in risky projects as a limiting
case, the result that also arises in the model by de Meza and Webb (1987).
3.4 Existence of PEII
Under PEII both types choose safe projects with probability 1; i.e. f1¡ ´¤H ; ´¤Hg =
f1; 0g and f1¡ ´¤L; ´¤Lg = f1; 0g. Now choosing risky project is a ?zero-probability?
event and Bayes? rule has no bite. If an entrepreneur deviates and chooses a risky
investment, the equilibrium beliefs regarding her type can be any distribution on £19.
Therefore, there will be a continuum of PEIIs, depending on how the equilibrium
beliefs are chosen.
Under PEII , ¿ = 0. Then according to Lemma 1,
UP EIIs =
® (ws ¡ b)
(® + ¯ + r) r
; U^P EII¾ =
® (®+ r)
¡
»PEII ¡ b¢+ ®¯ ¡»PEII ¡ ws¢
(®+ r) (®+ ¯ + r) r
:
Obviously, since UH;PEII¾ > U
L;P EII
¾ , it su¢ces to derive the condition under which
type-µH does not deviate from PEII . The condition, UH;PEII¾ · UPEIIs obtains
Lemma 6 PEII , i.e ´¤H = 0 and ´
¤
L = 0; exists, if
¯ ¸ pH
¡




¢ (® + r) ´ ^¯PEII (®) ;
and if »PEII ¡ ws < 0. Otherwise, PEII is not feasible.
19Note that the same is true in the case of PEI where the ?zero-probability? event is the case where
an entrepreneur chooses a safe project. However, since entrepreneur?s type do not a¤ect the outcome






Figure 4: Feasibility of PEII
The magnitude of the threshold ^¯
PEII
(®) depends on the equilibrium beliefs
¹^ (!¾). Hence, there is a continuum of PEIIs supported by di¤erent beliefs. In order
to limit the amount of equilibria, one needs to restrict the way in which beliefs can
be updated in the case of ?zero-probability? events. One option is the requirement of
consistency of sequential equilibrium á la Kreps and Wilson (1982):
Lemma 7 The consistency requirement of sequential equilibrium implies
¹¤ (!¾) = ¹¸;
so that »PEII = ¹¸pH +
¡
1¡ ¹¸¢ pL = »PEI ´ Ã:
Proof. See Appendix B.
Figure 4 represents the frontiers above which the PEII - under di¤erent equilib-
rium beliefs - exists in the ®¯-plane. The bold line represents the frontier associated
with the ?o¤-equilibrium? beliefs that satisfy the consistency requirement. Note that
PEII exists globally if »
P EII < pHb= (pH ¡ ws + b) :
3.5 Supplement: Con?rming ?nanciers? participation
We still need to check that, under any candidate equilibrium, ?nanciers are willing
to trade. The mode of the bilateral trading implies that ?nanciers can never earn
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less than their reservation value, V0. Therefore, ?nanciers are always willing to trade,
unless the reservation value is negative (we want to rule out the possibility of losses
in steady state). In order to con?rm that V0 is non-negative, we derive the following
result
Lemma 8 Under any credit market equilibrium, either »¤ > b or each type?s optimal
strategy obtains f1¡ ´¤i ; ´¤i g = f1; 0g implying ¿ = 0 (i.e. risky investments are never
implemented).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 8 states that, under any equilibrium regime, entrepreneurs choose risky
projects only if the expected output from those investments exceeds ?nancier?s oppor-
tunity cost, b. Since loan contracts guarantee ?nanciers at least a repayment equal
to b, a fact that can be con?rmed by considering the worst possible scenario from
?nanciers? point of view, i.e. ' ! 0, and obtain lim'!0 Ri = b, Lemma 8 directly
implies that V0 ¸ 0; which guarantees ?nanciers? participation.
4 Concluding remarks
The paper postulates a bilateral trading mechanism that enables a convenient intro-
duction of informational asymmetries into a credit market model with search frictions.
The model incorporates heterogeneity not only in the borrowers? types but also in the
intrinsic riskiness of the available entrepreneurial projects. The observable riskiness
of the chosen project works as an informative signal about the unobservable type of
the entrepreneur. The e¢ciency of trading is determined by relative loan prices and
borrower?s self-selection among the available business opportunities. Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is used as a solution concept.
The e¢cient allocational regime, the separating equilibrium, exists only under
su¢ciently ?liquid? market conditions; i.e., when the number of ?nanciers in the credit
market is relatively large compared to the number of loan applicants. Better mar-
ket liquidity increases the rate at which a ?nancier can be located - a feature which
improves entrepreneurs? ?bargaining power? through more valuable ?outside option?.
As a result, entrepreneurs? private return from ?nancial matching comes closer to the
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available social return so that entrepreneurs face greater incentives to select projects ef-
?ciently. E¢ciency deteriorates gradually as credit market ?tightness? increases. These
?ndings contradict with the previous results due to Becsi, Li and Wang (2003) who
conclude that greater credit market liquidity tends to dilute the average quality of
projects. Moreover, since greater liquidity indicates more intense competition among
?nanciers, the commonly asserted trade-o¤ between competition and excess risk taking
does not emerge in our model: default risk (or ?nancial fragility) is more prominent
under less competitive (tight) rather than more competitive (liquid) market conditions.
We also ?nd that lower search frictions tend to increase the probability of adverse
selection so that a trade-o¤ between total volume of trading and e¢cient project
selection may arise. This general trade-o¤ does not, however, necessarily imply that
there would be adverse selection in the competitive limit. That depends crucially on
the index of credit market tightness and the distribution of types.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (i) Under separating regime, Bayes? rule gives ¹¤ (!¾) = 1. Moreover,




® (® + r) (pH ¡ b) + ®
¡
1¡ ¹¸¢¯ (pH ¡ ws)
(®+ r) (®+ ¯ + r) r
USEs =
® (® + r) (ws ¡ b)¡ ®¹¸¯ (pH ¡ ws)
(® + r) (® + ¯ + r) r
:





(pH ¡ ws) + USEs > USEs :





UH;SE¾ · USEs ;
which can be written as
¯ · pH (ws ¡ pL)¡ (pH ¡ pL) b
(pH ¡ ws)Ã (® + r) ´
^¯SE (®) ;
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which in turn coincides with the condition that implies ´L · 0.
(ii) Under PEI , ¹¤ (!¾) = ¹¸; ¿ = 1 and » = ¹¸pH +
¡
1¡ ¹¸¢ pL ´ Ã: By Lemma 1










® (® + r) (ws ¡ b)¡ ®¯ (Ã ¡ ws)
(®+ r) (®+ ¯ + r) r
:
Thus, UL;PEI¾ ¸ UPEIs i¤
¯ ¸ Ã (ws ¡ b)¡ pL (Ã ¡ b)
Ã (Ã ¡ ws) (®+ r) ´
^¯P EI (®) ;
which is the same as the conditions that implies ´L ¸ 1.
(iii) Points (i) and (ii) con?rm that no pure-strategy equilibrium is feasible if




s , which is the
necessary and su¢cient condition for having a SSE.
B Proof of Lemma 7




j (!) = 0;
then there exists a sequence of strategies, f1¡ ´ni ; ´ni g, such that




2) ´¤i = lim
n!1
´ni , and
3) ¹¤ (!) = lim
n!1
¸ (µH) ´nH (!)P
µj2£
¸ (µj) ´nj (!)
:
These conditions presume that ?nanciers? beliefs can be regarded as limits of totally
mixed strategies and associated beliefs converging to the candidate equilibrium. Con-
ditions 1-3 state that, 1) nth strategy in the sequence puts positive probability on
both !s and !¾, 2) these strategies converge to entrepreneur?s candidate equilibrium
strategy, and 3) the beliefs calculated from Bayes? rule using strategies in the sequence
converge to the candidate equilibrium beliefs.
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Now, assuming the consistency requirement, we get












1¡ ¹¸¢ "n = ¹¸:
C Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. At least some risky investments are implemented in SE, SSE and PEI .
Evidently, by Assumption 1, »SE = pH > b. Moreover, PEI exists only if »
P EI = Ã ¸
ws > b. Now, if Ã ¡ ws < 0, the condition that would guarantee the existence of PEI
would obtain ¯ · ^¯P EI (®) < 0, which is impossible because negative arrival rates are
ruled out.
Regarding SSE, if Ã ¡ ws < 0, there must be a threshold ¹´L 2 (0; 1) s.t.
»SSE p¹´L2(0;1) ¡ws = 0:
But »SSE p¹´L2(0;1) ¡ws = 0 implies that U^SSE¾ p¹´L2(0;1) ¡USSEs = 0, which in turn
implies that UL;SSE¾ p¹´L2(0;1) ¡USSEs < 0. Thus, in order to have UL;SSE¾ = USSEs , one
must have ´¤L < ¹´L, which directly implies »
SSE p´¤L2(0;1)> ws > b.
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Chapter IV
Non-linear wages and the distribution of
skills
Abstract
The paper provides a theory of wage formation in a simple continuous time
search model with vertically di¤erentiated labor. Workers can opt to search for
alternative contacts meanwhile the ongoing meeting with an employer. Unlike
under Nash bargaining, the resulting sharing rule is endogenous and it depends
on the rate at which (i) workers locate alternative employers and (ii) employers
receive applications from the unemployed. The model produces non-linear wage
structure in a sense that more skilled workers earn strictly larger fraction of the
output than workers belonging to lower skill groups. Non-linear wages mitigate
the need for strong skill-biased technological change to explain the simultaneous
increase in both supply and price of skilled labor. Other predictions of the model
include: 1) A mean-preserving spread in the skill distribution induces greater
wage dispersion. 2) A worker can extract the more surplus the less there are
equally able workers in the market. 3) There is a La¤er-curve type relationship
between market tightness and upper tail wage di¤erentials.
1 Introduction
The paper provides a theory of wage formation in a simple continuous-time search
model with heterogenous labor. We postulate a trading process that produces an
endogenous sharing rule arising from economic fundamentals and which establishes a
theoretical linkage between equilibrium wage di¤erentials and the distribution of skills.
Neither of these features typically arise in models with one-sided heterogeneity where
the transferable surplus is divided according to an exogenous sharing rule, e.g. Nash
bargaining.
We utilize and extend a framework developed by Kultti (2000) and Kultti and
Virrankoski (2004). The main idea is that, upon a meeting, the employer makes a wage
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o¤er to the unemployed worker in a ?take-it-or-leave-it? manner. However, if trading
seems unfavorable for the worker, he does not have to trade immediately but may
choose to wait and continue search besides the ongoing meeting. If the worker decides
to wait, either a new employee candidate may show up or the worker manages to
locate another employer. Then, the party with two competing players must engage in
a bidding contest. As shown by Kultti and Virrankoski (2004), employers? equilibrium
strategy upon the initial meeting is to propose a wage o¤er that is just good enough
to prevent the worker from exercising his waiting option. The wage is unique for each
skill group.
This construction may connote the work by Julien, Kennes and King (2000)
who develop a "competing-auction" setting to model wage formation. In their model,
each unemployed worker announces a reserve wage (the lowest wage that would be
acceptable for him) to attract employers to trade with him. If only one employer
approaches the candidate worker, then trading takes place at the reserve wage. If there
will be more than one interested employers, then the worker sells his labor services
to the highest bidder. However, the aim of Julien et al.?s (2000) paper is to derive
wage dispersion with homogeneous workers and postulate a mechanism that generates
an endogenous matching function. They do not seek to discuss the linkage between
the distribution of skills and the wage structure. Our model is also related to the
earlier contribution by Bester (1988), who considers equilibrium price distributions in
a search theoretic context with di¤erentiated sellers. Likewise in our case, the driving
force in his model is the consumer?s option to quit the current bargaining in order
to search for another seller.1 The key di¤erence between Bester?s model and ours is
that, even though the value of the option to quit depends on the expected bargaining
outcome in all other meetings, Bester does not directly allow competitive situation
between agents of the same kind.
We will show that, given any two skill levels, the ?wait-and-continue-search? op-
tion is disproportionately more valuable for the more skilled than for the less skilled
worker. The equilibrium wages are therefore non-linear: more skilled workers earn
strictly larger fraction of the matching surplus than workers belonging to lower skill
groups. Quite surprisingly, non-linear prices emerge in a ?quasi-competitive? set-up
1Another paper that utilizes this kind of intuition is the work by Samuelson (1992). However, his
main aim is to explain disagreement as an equilibrium phenomenom.
74
under homogenous buyer preferences (i.e. identical employers) and without any infor-
mational frictions or active market segmentation. When conventional Nash bargaining
is used as a price formation method wages are typically linear in the sense that the
price of the productivity unit is the same for all skill groups2. Moreover, under ex-
ogenous Nash sharing rule, the skill composition of the work force does not a¤ect
the shape of the wage schedule. Instead, our construction give rise to the appealing
intuition that a high-skilled worker is able to extract more surplus from the employer
when there are only few equally able workers in the market than in the case when the
market is ?ooded with high-skilled workers. In other words, the wage di¤erential be-
tween a productivity level xi+m and a lower reference level xi is the greater the larger
is the fraction of workers being less skilled than the level xi+m, say F (xi+m¡1): Thus,
if the skill distribution of a country A is ?better? than that of a country B in a ?rst-
order stochastic dominance sense (i.e. 8x FA(x) · FB(x)), then the wage structure
should be narrower in country A than in country B:3 This result therefore supports
the view that the di¤erences in the distribution of skills might well be an important
determinant behind the well-documented German-US di¤erences in wage structure
(e.g. Nickell, 1997, 1998, and Freeman and Schettkat, 2001). Moreover, non-linearity
of wages imply that a mean-preserving spread in the skill distribution leads to greater
wage dispersion - a feature that is also supported by number of empirical studies (e.g.
Blackburn et al., 1991, and Devroy and Freeman, 2001).
Our theory can also help to explain the puzzling trend (cf. Katz and Autor, 1999,
for an overview) that a substantial growth in the relative supply of skilled labor has
in most industrialized economies been accompanied by increasing ?skill premium? in
2Non-linear wages may also arise under Nash bargaining in models with two-sided heterogeneity
(e.g. Sattinger, 1995 and Delacroix, 2003). If not only workers di¤er in their skills but also jobs
are di¤erent in terms of skill requirements, labor market equilibria entailing mismatch between skills
and skill requirements may generate irregular wages. In these models, however, the wage dispersion
is driven by the equilibrium matching pattern (e.g. Acemoglu, 1999, Albrecht and Vroman, 2002,
Blázquez and Jansen, 2003, and Dolado et al., 2003) rather than by the composition of talents and
job characteristics.
3A somewhat similar result is obtained by Kremer and Maskin (1997) who consider a model
where workers of di¤erent skills form teams. Reminiscent of Kremer?s (1993) ?O-ring theory?, if the
distribution of skills is su¢ciently disperse, only alike workers are assembled in a team. As a result,
high- and low skilled workers produce in their own teams (or ?rms) which leads to greater wage
dispersion.
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wages. Many previous studies (e.g. Katz et al., 1993, Katz and Autor, 1999, and
Krusell et al. 2000) assert that a strong skill-biased technological change has to be
the key factor explaining the phenomenon4. However, if there is a common increase in
labor productivity throughout the skill groups, non-linear wages imply that workers
belonging to upper tail skill groups gain disproportionately. Therefore even if the
distribution of skills would be transformed to weight higher skill groups, the wage
dispersion may still generally increase if the magnitude of the general productivity
upgrade is su¢ciently large. Hence, non-linear wages mitigate the need for strong
skill-biased technological change to explain the simultaneous increase in both supply
and price of skilled labor.
Regarding the e¤ect of labor market tightness on equilibrium wage structure, we
show that an increase in the ratio of vacant jobs and the number of unemployed always
leads to an increase in lower tail wage di¤erentials. In the upper tail, however, we iden-
tify a La¤er-curve type relationship between market tightness and wage gaps. When
the labor market is su¢ciently tight initially, a marginal increase in labor demand
tends to widen also the upper tail wage di¤erentials. But when the market is ?slack?
ex ante, increasing demand actually compresses upper tail wages. This is because
a marginal increase in demand dilutes part of the high-skilled workers? comparative
advantage when vacant jobs are the short side of the market.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2.1-2.3 de?ne the basic environment
of the model. The wage formation analysis is carried out in Section 2.4. Section 3 is
devoted to elaborating the main predictions of the model. Section 4 o¤ers an extension
that supplements the basic analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Basic set-up
The labor market is populated by a continuum of unemployed workers and a larger
continuum of ?rms who post open vacancies. Workers are heterogeneous in their
4Acemoglu (1999) provides a theory of ?endogenous? skill-biased technological progress. In his
model, an increase in the supply of skills increases the ?market size for skill-complementary technolo-
gies? and thereby may induce skill-biased technological change.
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skills and the n di¤erent skill groups are indexed by xi = x1; x2; :::; xn. Workers are
distributed over these groups according to the distribution function F (x). Firms are
identical and have a unit demand for labor. The output ?ow generated by a vacancy
?lled with a worker belonging to a group xi is denoted by qi. Better skilled workers
are strictly more productive than less skilled workers; i.e. qj > qi 8j > i: Irrespective
to the skill level, all unemployed have a unit supply of labor and they value their work
e¤ort at zero.
Trading takes place in private meetings between unemployed workers and ?rms.
In order to locate a potential employer, workers must commit to a search process.
Search e¤ort is costless per se but it is time-consuming5 which creates frictions on
the functioning of the market. The frequency at which ?rms receive applications and
unemployed workers locate vacant jobs is governed by an exogenous matching function,
M (u; v), that gives the total number of matches at each point of time as a function
of two inputs, the number of currently unemployed (u) and the number of vacant jobs
(v). As usual, the matching function is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly
concave in both arguments and it exhibits constant returns to scale.
Since time is continuous, Poisson arrival rates can be used to measure the ?ow
probabilities of locating (receiving) a vacant job (an application). An unemployed
worker locates an open vacancy at rate ® while a ?rm with an un?lled vacancy receives
an application from an unemployed worker at rate ¯: Pairwise matching requires ®u =
¯v =M (u; v).
Labor market tightness, µ = v=u, is the ratio between open vacancies and unem-
ployed workers. The CRS-property of the matching function implies that the meeting




´ µm (µ) and ¯ = M (u; v)
v
´ m (µ) ; (1)
where m (µ) = M(1=µ;1). The strict concavity of the matching function M implies
that m (µ) is decreasing and convex in µ. m0(µ) < 0 and > 0. Thus, increasing labor
market tightness improves (reduces) the rate at which unemployed workers (?rms)
locate vacant jobs (receive applications); i.e. ®0(µ) = @ [µm(µ)] =@µ > 0 and ¯ 0(µ) =
m0(µ) < 0. For notational convenience, we continue to denote the meeting rates by
® and ¯, even though they are not parameters but endogenously determined labor
5Having direct search costs would introduce just another friction to the search process.
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market variables. This is done because our focus is on the wage formation process
rather than in the construction of a complete theory of (un)employment dynamics, as
is typically the case in the conventional Mortensen-Pissarides (Mortensen, 1982, and
Pissarides, 1984, 2000) framework6. The endogeneity of these variables is taken into
account as we discuss the predictions of the model.
From ?rms? side we assume unrestricted entry. The cost of opening a vacancy
is denoted by ©, which can be thought to capture all the other factors of production
except the worker. Firms will open new vacancies until the expected pro?t from a
?lled vacancy, which will be denoted by V 0, equals the ?xed cost, ©. New unemployed
workers are born at a constant and exogenous rate ´. Steady state requires that
®u = ´.7 Labor contracts are lifelong relationships so that, after a successful match,
both the hired worker and the ?lled vacancy exit the market forever. A steady state
equilibrium (i.e. steady state values for u, v, ® and ¯) is completely determined
by the four equations: the pairwise matching condition and its equivalence with the
exogenous matching function, ?rms? free-entry condition and the exogenous birth rate
of new unemployed.
2.2 Trading
The trading process is an extension of the models by Kultti (2000) and Kultti and
Virrankoski (2004), the key di¤erence being the assumption of heterogeneous sellers
(=unemployed workers). Upon a meeting with a worker, the employer makes a wage
o¤er in a ?take-it-or-leave-it? manner8. If trading seems unfavorable for the worker, it
is assumed that he does not have to break up the contact completely but he may opt
6In Mortensen-Pissarides framework labor market tightness, µ, is typically the key variable which
determines equilibrium unemployement and employment and, if the agents are heterogeneous, the
?matching pattern?.
7This assumption replaces the exogenous job destruction typically assumed in the Mortensen-
Pissarides model.
8This assumption may seem quite restrictive and arbitrary. However, it is pretty straight-forward
to verify that the alternative cases where the initiative is either unilaterally granted to the workers
or it is randomly allocated at every meeting change very little the main economic predictions of the
model. Explicit calculations are available from the author upon request.
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to wait and continue search besides the ongoing meeting9. If the worker decides to
wait, he locates another employer at rate ®. In that case, the two employer candidates
raise their wage o¤ers until driven to their reservation utilities. On the other hand, at
rate ¯ another unemployed approaches the employer and there will be two competing
workers. They reduce their wage demands until either (or both) of them rather leaves
the meeting than further lowers the wage demand. Figure 1 depicts the timing of
events.
Obviously, the ?wait-and-continue-search? option is the only trump card in worker?s
hands. If he did not have that, the employer could propose a wage o¤er that would
make the worker indi¤erent between accepting the o¤er and staying unemployed. Em-
ployer?s equilibrium strategy is to propose a wage o¤er that is just good enough to
prevent the worker from using his waiting option so that no worker ever opts to wait.
The bold arrows in Figure 1 depict the ?equilibrium path? while the dashed arrows
represent the ?o¤-equilibrium paths?. As in Kultti and Virrankoski (2004), the con-
struction of the equilibrium is based on the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 (i) If the employer o¤ers a wage that produces the worker less utility
than the value of the waiting option, the worker rather waits for new agents to arrive
than leaves the meeting. (ii) Instead of terminating the meeting immediately, the
employer is willing to trade at equilibrium wages with any worker - regardless of his
skill level.
The ?rst part of the Conjecture 1 is rather obvious, since the worst scenario in
waiting option is that the worker is driven to his reservation utility level - which is
the utility the worker gets if he opts to disgard the initial contact immediately. The
second part requires that any match in the labor market creates enough surplus in
order for employers to have su¢cient incentive to trade. If trading with the least able
worker produces more output10 than the ?xed cost ©, then the requirement is met in
equilibrium. A formal con?rmation of the Conjecture 1 is given in Section 2.4.
In the main analysis we assume that employers cannot commit to throwing aside
an unemployed who has opted to wait; i.e. employers cannot prevent workers from
9The postulated set-up is a sort of continuous-time version of the ?urn-ball model? á la Butters
(1977) where multiple simultaneous contacts are possible.
10In present value terms.
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maintaining their previous contacts while searching for other wage o¤ers. This as-
sumption quarantees that the wait and search -option is available to any unemployed.
The assumption is made in order to keep the focus on the main qualitative properties
of the wage function. The supplementary Section 4 discusses how the equilibrium
might change if we allowed employers to disregard worker candidates who has opted
to wait. It turns out that the seemingly restrictive assumption is rather innocent in
terms of model predictions11.
Finally,
Conjecture 2 If the unemployed worker decides to wait, then transaction is concluded
once a competing agent appears in either side of the negotiation table; i.e. there will
be no ?further waiting?.
Conjecture 2 postulates that even though the workers would have unlimited pos-
sibilities to wait, transactions will be concluded immediately after either another em-
ployer has been located or another worker candidate has shown up. Also this con-
jecture will be shown to hold in equilibrium.12. Conjectures 1-2 state that the ?thin?
dashed lines in Figure 1 describe irrelevant o¤-equilibrium paths.
The next section enumerates the main Bellman equations of the model. After
that we are ready to proceed with equilibrium wage determination in Section 2.4.
2.3 The Bellman equations
Both workers and ?rms are risk neutral and discount their future earnings with a
common discount rate r: Assume that the equilibrium wage available for the worker
possessing skills xi is wi. Given the equilibrium wages, the discounted value of an
open vacancy is denoted by V 0 while the discounted value of a job ?lled with a worker
with skills xi is denoted by Vi. The discounted value of being unemployed is denoted
by U0i and of being employed by Ui.
11In the more general case, it will be shown that the value of waiting for the lower tail skill groups
may, under certain conditions, go to zero so that these workers would immediately have to trade at
their reservation utility levels. However, wages for skill groups who has positive value for waiting
behave exactly as in the simpli?ed model.
12Essentially the same result is also veri?ed by Kultti and Virrankoski (2004, pp. 6) in a model
with homogeneous agents.
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Figure 1: Timing of events







; 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng : (2)














; 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng ; (4)






(F (xs)¡ F (xs¡1)) Vs; (5)
Under unrestricted entry, ?rms expect to earn zero pro?ts; i.e. V 0 = ©. Moreover, let
us de?ne Qi ´ qi=r and assume Qi > © 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng, so that the surplus generated
by any match in the labor market is strictly positive.
2.4 Equilibrium wages
The analysis in this section proceeds as follows: We ?rst ?nd those wages for each
skill group that make the workers indi¤erent between accepting the wage o¤er and
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??
UW i, UW j s.t. j=i and F at the meeting;
UW i lower his wage demand until
driven to U0i
UW i, UW i-1 and F at the meeting;
UW i earns Ûi= Q i-Q i-1+ U0i-1
1-F(xi-1)
UW i and two Fs at the meeting;
Fs engage in an auction à
UW i earns Q i-V0
UW i waits
F(x i-1) -F(xi-2)
UW i, UW1 and F at the meeting;
UW i earns Ûi= Q i-Q1+ U01
F(x1)
Figure 2: Unemployed waiting
waiting. After that we con?rm that such a wage schedule constitutes an equilibrium;
i.e. Conjectures 1-2 hold.
Consider a meeting between an employer and a worker belonging to a skill group
xi. Figure 2 illustrates the prospects of the worker if he decides to reject the employer?s
o¤er and start searching for alternative contacts. If the worker manages to locate
another employer, which happens at rate ®, the two competing ?rms engage in an
auction for the right to hire the worker; i.e. ?rms raise their bids until the utility
from hiring equals their expected reservation utility, V 0. However, if another worker
happens to appear instead (which occurs at rate ¯), the resulting wage will depend
on whether the newcomer is at least equally skilled or less skilled than the incumbent
worker.
Assume ?rst that the appearing rival belongs to a skill group xk < xi. Then the
less skilled competitor lowers his wage demand until he gets U0k . The better skilled
incumbent knows that his rival?s lowest acceptable wage will provide the employer
with a discounted value equal to
V Ck = Qk ¡ U 0k :
If the incumbent worker wants to trade, he needs to propose a wage demand that
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produces the employer at least the same utility V Ck . Let us denote the utilities gained
by the ?rm and the incumbent worker from such a wage demand by V^ ki and U^
k
i
respectively. Clearly, the highest wage the incumbent worker with skills xi is able to
demand must satisfy the following condition:
V^ ki = V
C
k , Qi ¡ U^ki = Qk ¡ U0k ;
which can be solved for U^ ki to yield
U^ki = U
0
k +Qi ¡ Qk, 8k 2 f1; 2; :::; i ¡ 1g :
Yet another conjecture, which will be shown to hold in equilibrium, guarantees that
the better skilled worker is willing to trade at a competitive situation:
Conjecture 3 U^ki > U
0
i :
On the other hand, with probability 1¡F (xi¡1) we have xk ¸ xi so that the arriv-
ing competitor is at least equally skilled as the incumbent worker and the incumbent
is driven to his reservation utility level U 0i :
Summarizing this lengthy description with a single equation, the Bellman equa-
tion representing the value of the ?waiting option? faced by a worker coming from the
skill groups xi reads as
rhi = ®
¡
Qi ¡ V 0 ¡ rhi
¢




(F (xk)¡ F (xk¡1)) U^ki ¡ rhi]; (6)
where the ?rst term on the right-hand side captures the chance of ending up to a
situation with two competing employers whereas the second term re?ects the expected
utility available when another worker happens to show up. Solving for hi gives
hi =
®
® + ¯ + r
¡




®+ ¯ + r




(F (xk)¡ F (xk¡1)) U^ ki ]: (7)
Since the initiative is on the employer?s side, the equilibrium wage o¤er proposed
upon a meeting is such that it makes the worker indi¤erent between accepting the
o¤er and waiting. Therefore the equilibrium wages for each skill group must satisfy
Ui = hi , wi = rhi: (8)
83
The wage at which the transaction is concluded is unique for each skill group. Unique-
ness follows as (8) is linear in wi and has a unique solution. The following lemmas
con?rm the conjectures made in the outset:
Lemma 1 Assuming Qi > © 8i ¸ f1; 2; :::; ng, Conjectures 1-2 hold in an equilibrium
established by the wage schedule given in (8).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (7), condition (8) and the employers? free-entry condition V 0 = © imply
that the wage earned by members of the lowest skill group, x1, yields
w1 =
® (® + r)
(®+ r)2 + ¯r
(q1 ¡ Á) ; (9)
where Á = r©.
In order to determine expressions for any wage levels wi s.t. 1 < i · n, let us
?rst derive the equilibrium wage di¤erential, ¢wi+1;i, between two consecutive skill
levels xi+1 and xi. Computing rhi+1 ¡ rhi obtains the following di¤erence equation13:
¢wi+1;i =
(®+ r) (®+ F (xi) ¯)
(®+ r)2 + F (xi)¯®+ ¯r
¢qi+1;i ´ ªi¢qi+1;i; (10)
where ªi is the fraction of the productivity di¤erence between the consecutive skill
levels i and i+1 that the more productive worker is able to capture in the transaction.
As an immediate extension of (10), the equilibrium wage di¤erential between any two




ªs¢qs+1;s; 8m 2 f1; 2; :::; n ¡ ig : (11)




ªs¢qs+1;s + w1; 8m 2 f1; 2; :::; ng . (12)
13As a curiosity, the continuous counterpart of this expression is relatively easy to show to yield
w0(x) =
(® + r) (® + F (x)¯)
(® + r)2 + F (x)¯® + ¯r
q0(x)
´ ª(x)q0(x);
which is a ?rst-order di¤erential equation.
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Since F (xs) · 1, it is straight-forward to show that 0 · ªs < 1, 8s 2 f1; 2; :::; n ¡ 1g14.













+ U 0k ; (13)
which con?rms that Conjecture 3 holds in equilibrium.
3 Model predictions
3.1 Non-linearity of wages
Since F (xs) is increasing with the skill level and since the fraction ªs of the productiv-
ity gain ¢qs+1;s that goes to the worker belonging to the skill group xs+1 is increasing
with F (xs), equation (12) implies that better skilled workers earn ever increasing
fraction of the output. Therefore we have





is increasing with the rank of the skill level xi in the sequence x1; x2; :::; xn.
Corollary 1 !i grows at a diminishing rate.
Proof. The fact that !i grows at a diminishing rate is because ªs is increasing and
concave in F (xs).
Note that our ?quasi-competitive? setting produces non-linear pricing rule, even
though the buyer?s preferences are homogeneous, there are no informational frictions
nor active market segmentation. The absolute wage-schedule is ?convex? because the
price of the net productivity unit is monotonically increasing. The non-linearity of
wages stems from the disparity in the values of the ?waiting options? between di¤erent
skill groups. This disparity is probably most transparently visible in equation (7) (or
in Figure 2): The waiting option of a worker is the more valuable the less there are
equally or better skilled candidates among unemployed workers. This is because the
expected utility available from trading in a situation when there are two competing









Figure 3: Equilibrium wages vs. Nash outcome
workers and one employer is the larger the smaller is the probability of having a better
skilled competitor.
It is instructive to compare the outcome of the current set-up to the wages that
result from generalized Nash bargaining. Let ½ (1 ¡ ½) denote worker?s (employer?s)
exogenous ?bargaining power? in Nash bargaining. In our context, the result of this
bargaining procedure can be derived from the model of alternating o¤ers á la Rubin-
stein (1982), where workers (?rms) make o¤ers in a ?take-it-or-leave-it? fashion with
probability ½ (1 ¡ ½). The sharing rule obtained under generalized Nash bargaining
can be written as
(1¡ ½) ¡Ui ¡ U 0i ¢ = ½ ¡Vi ¡ V 0¢ : (14)
Utilizing equations (2), (3) and (4), equation (14) implies that
wNBi =
½ (® + r)
½® + r
(qi ¡ Á) and !NBi =
½ (® + r)
½®+ r
´ ¹!NB:
Hence, Nash wages are only sensitive to the workers? contact rate with vacancies
(®) and to the exogenous bargaining power parameter (½). Moreover, since !NBi is a
constant ¹!NB, the pricing rule generated by Nash bargaining is linear. Unsurprisingly,
!NBi is increasing in both ® and ½. Instead, the externalities generated by employers?
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contact rate with workers (¯) and the skill-distribution (F (xs)) do not a¤ect the wage
schedule. This is because the axiomatic bargaining game with a ?xed sharing rule fails
to internalize the disparity between better skilled and less skilled workers? relative
bargaining powers. Figure 3 illustrates the di¤erence between the non-linear wages
derived in the current model (upper diagrams) and Nash wages (lower diagrams).
3.2 Distribution of skills and wage structure
Proposition 1 A mean-preserving spread in the distribution of skills leads to greater
wage dispersion.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This result is due to the feature that the wage di¤erential between two consecutive
skill levels is increasing but concave function of the ?probability mass? below the higher
skill group. In other words, a mean-preserving spread in the skill distribution increases
the lower tail wage di¤erentials more than it reduces the wage gaps in the upper tail.
As a result, the overall wage dispersion becomes wider. There is a host of evidence
indicating that countries where workers? skills are more polarized tend to have higher
wage dispersion, too (e.g. Blackburn et al., 1991, and Devroy and Freeman, 2001). A
typical case has been the comparison between Germany and the US: Germany?s wage
structure is substantially more compressed than in the US. Nickell (1997, 1998) and
Nickell and Bell (1996) show that the distribution of skills is itself much narrower in
Germany than in the US. On the other hand, Freeman and Schettkat (2001) report
that the fraction of the high-skilled is roughly the same in both countries but ?the
lower tail of less skilled workers is practically absent in Germany while it is substantial
in the US?. Their ?nding implies that Germany?s distribution of skills actually exhibits
?rst-order stochastic dominance in relation to the corresponding distribution in the
US. Therefore we have
Proposition 2 Assume that the labor productivities of the n skill groups are identical
in countries A and B; i.e. qAi = q
B
i 8i 2 f1; 2; :::ng : Let F A (x) and FB (x) describe
the distributions of workers? skills in countries A and B respectively. If
FA (xi) · FB (xi) ; 8xi 2 fxk; xk+1; :::; xk+lg ½ fx1; x2; :::; xng ;
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then
¢wAi+m;i · ¢wBi+m;i; 8i 2 fk; k + 1; :::; k + lg and m 2 f1; 2; :::; k + l ¡ ig :
Proof. Follows directly from equation (11).
According to the commonly held view, the disparity in transatlantic wage dis-
tributions is mainly due to the institutional di¤erences in wage setting (e.g. Siebert,
1997). However, since Germany looks like country A and the US like country B in
Proposition 2, our non-linear wages support the hypothesis that the shape of the dis-
tribution of skills might at least partly explain the German-US di¤erence in wage
structure.
3.3 Wage dispersion and market tightness
At this stage of the analysis, we want to point out that when deriving comparative
static results, any changes in the skill distribution may a¤ect ?rm?s incentives to open
new vacancies. More frequent market entry by ?rms is followed by greater market
tightness; i.e. the ratio between vacant jobs and unemployed, µ = v=u; is increased.
Hence, besides having a direct e¤ect on the wage structure, any change in the skill
distribution that a¤ects the expected value of an average vacancy also a¤ect ?rm?s
entry decision and thereby the contact rates ® (µ) and ¯ (µ). Therefore the result
in Proposition 2 should also be conditioned on possible disparities in labor market
tightness. A mean-preserving spread, however, is neutral in terms of µ because it does
not change the average value of a ?lled vacancy.
Substituting ® and ¯ in equations (9)-(12) with the expressions given in (1) and
di¤erentiating ªs w.r.t. µ we have
Proposition 3 (i) The lower tail wage di¤erentials increase along with greater labor
market tightness. (ii) If
®0 (µ) + ¯ 0 (µ) > 0;
then a marginal increase in market tightness increases the upper tail wage di¤erentials.
Otherwise, the upper tail wages become more compressed.
Proof. See Appendix C.
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Greater labor market tightness means that there are more available jobs per one
unemployed worker so that it becomes easier for the unemployed to locate a potential
employer; i.e. ® increases. This fact generally increases workers? value of waiting
because higher ® means higher probability of having two employers engaging in an
auction for the worker. In such an occasion transaction is concluded with a wage that
drives the employers to their reservation utility levels. The worker then captures all
remaining surplus, which is the larger the better skilled the worker is. As a result,
high-skilled workers bene?t disproportionately and wage di¤erentials tend to increase.
This prediction is in line with some earlier models (for instance Acemoglu, 1997) as well
as with empirical observations (e.g. DiNardo et al., 1996). However, greater market
tightness also reduces the rate at which ?rms receive applications (¯) which lowers
the probability of ending up with a situation where two workers must compete for the
same vacancy. In a competitive situation, high-skilled workers are better protected
against the downward pressure in wages. As increasing market tightness reduces the
probability of competition between two workers, high-skilled workers? comparative
advantage dilutes. If this e¤ect is strong enough the upper tail wages may actually
become more compressed. Wage compression in upper tail wages results if a marginal
increase in µ worsens the congestion on employers? side more than it increases the
contact probability on workers? side, i.e. when j¯ 0 (µ)j > ®0 (µ). This is the case when
market tightness is initially low, so that a marginal increase in the number of vacancies
improves worker?s contact rate only a little but has a greater congestion e¤ect on ?rms?
side.
In fact, Proposition 3 establishes a La¤er-curve type relationship between upper
tail wage di¤erentials and market tightness. When unemployed workers are the short
side of the market, i.e. market tightness is high enough, increasing demand unambigu-
ously widen the upper tail wage gaps. When vacant jobs are the short side, higher
demand compresses upper tail wages.
3.4 Wage dispersion, skill premium and technical change
Many empirical studies (cf. Katz and Autor, 1999, for an overview) reveal the puz-
zling trend that a substantial growth in the relative supply of skilled labor has in most
industrialized economies been accompanied by increasing ?skill premium? in wages.
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Likewise common sense, Proposition 2 suggests that an increase in the fraction of
high-skilled labor should reduce that premium. However, there are also two coun-
terbalancing e¤ects present in our model. Firstly, an increase in the average skill
level of the labor force should stimulate labor demand; i.e. market tightness should
increase. Proposition 3 then implies that, especially if the unemployed workers are
the short side of the market, wage di¤erentials should become wider throughout the
skill groups. Secondly, if there is a general upgrade in productivity, say by a factor ±,
non-linearity of wages implies that workers belonging to upper tail skill groups gain
disproportionately from the upgrade. Thus, even if the distribution of skills would be
transformed to weight higher skill groups, wage dispersion may still increase, if the
positive demand e¤ect and a possible concurrent upgrade in labor productivity are
large enough. A number of studies (e.g. Katz et al., 1993, Katz and Autor, 1999,
and Krusell et al. 2000) indicate that skill-biased technological change has to be the
key factor explaining the rise in the skill premium. Our theory of non-linear wages,
however, mitigates the need for strong skill-biased technological change to explain the
simultaneous increase in both supply and price of skilled labor.
Meckl and Zink (2002) point out that the wage di¤erentials by skill groups have
actually evolved non-monotonically. The time path of the relative wage has typically
been U-shaped in the sense that wage di¤erentials by skills fell during the 1970s, and
started to increase only during the 1980s and 1990s. The U-shaped time path might
suggest that the upgrading of skills may have overrun the demand e¤ect and the pace
of technological progress in the 1970s while the pattern would have been reversed
during the 1980s and the 1990s. Indeed, according to Katz and Autor (1999), relative
supply of skilled labor rose most in the 1970s.
4 Supplement: Employers can disregard workers
who opt to wait
In the basic model in Section 2 the analysis was simpli?ed by the assumption that
employers cannot commit to disregarding an unemployed who has opted to wait. This
restriction was made in order to keep the focus on the main qualitative properties of
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Figure 4: Timing of events when ?rms can disregard waiting workers
this assumption. Figure 4 depicts the more general structure of the trading process.
Comparing to the basic case illustrated in Figure 1, the only di¤erence is that now the
employer may choose to break up the meeting if the worker decides to wait (marked
by a star in the ?gure).
The essential question is whether it ever pays for the employer to leave a worker
who has rejected the wage o¤er but decided to wait. Obviously, the employer chooses
to discard the unemployed if the expected payo¤ from allowing the worker to keep up
the initial contact is less than employer?s reservation value; i.e. if hFi < V
0, where
hFi denotes the employer?s discounted value of waiting with a worker belonging to the
skill group xi.
Lemma 2 Assume that the unemployed worker belonging to skill group xi has chosen




® (®+ 2r) + r (¯ + r)
¯ (2®+ ¯ + r)
¶
© = ¹ (®; ¯)© > ©:
Proof. See Appendix D..
Hence, employers are willing to maintain a contact to any worker only if the
productivity of the least skilled worker is su¢ciently high; i.e. if
Q1 ¸ ¹ (®; ¯)©: (15)
Obviously, @¹=@® > 0 and @¹=@¯ < 0. Therefore the condition (15) is the less
restrictive the more severe the search frictions on worker?s side (the lower is ®) are
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and the easier it is for employers to locate unemployed workers (the higher is ¯); i.e.
the lower is market tightness µ. This is because keeping up the meeting is the more
(the less) valuable for the employer the higher is the probability that next agent to
appear at the meeting is another worker (employer).
Assume now that (15) does not hold. Generally, there might be a whole subset
of skill groups in the lower tail of the skill distribution who cannot choose to wait
because waiting would trigger the employer to break up the contact. Let us denote by
xt the lowest skill group with whom the employer is willing to wait; i.e.
hFt ¸ V 0 but hFt¡1 < V 0: (16)
Skill groups below xt must trade immediately upon the meeting at the reservation
utility level; i.e. wi = rU 0i for i < t. Since there are no outside options in the
model and since all workers value their working e¤ort at zero, the equilibrium wages
throughout these skill groups must obtain ¹w = 0.
Analogous to (7), the value of the waiting option for a skill level xi ¸ xt yields
h0i =
®
®+ ¯ + r
¡





®+ ¯ + r
[(1¡ F (xi¡1))U0i +
i¡1X
k=1
(F (xk)¡ F (xk¡1)) U^ ki ]; (17)
where
U^ ki =
8<: Qi ¡ Qk; 8i ¸ t; k = 1; 2; :::; t ¡ 1Qi ¡ Qk + U0k , 8i ¸ t; k = t; t+ 1; :::; n :
Setting h0i = wi=r and h
0
i+1 = wi+1=r for i ¸ t, the equilibrium wage di¤erential
between two consecutive skill groups above xt obtains
¢wi+1;i =
(®+ r) (®+ F (xi)¯)
(® + r)2 + F (xi) ¯®+ ¯r
¢qi+1;i = ªi¢qi+1;i;
which is equivalent to the formula in (10). Note that the properties of the strictly
positive part of the wage schedule are perfectly isomorphic to the qualitative results
derived in Section 2.
Thus, allowing employers to disregard unemployed workers who have opted to
wait creates a sharp jump in the wage schedule: workers belonging to skill groups
x1 ¡ xt¡1 must trade at ¹w = 0 while the wages above the threshold skill level xt
behave exactly in the same way as described in Section 2. From (17) it is easy to
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Figure 5: Equilibrium wages with ?rms being able to quit at any stage
compute the wage level wt for the threshold skill group xt so that the complete wage
schedule is given by
wi =
8>><>>:





; for i = t;Pi¡1
s=t+1ªs¢qs;t + wt; 8i > t:
(18)
Figure 5 illustrates the schedule.
Finally,
Lemma 3 Assuming Qi > © 8i ¸ f1; 2; :::; ng, Conjectures 1-2 hold in an equilibrium
established by the wage schedule given in (18).
Proof. See Appendix E.
The explicit determination of the threshold skill class xt according to conditions
given in (16) is rather complicated. However, it should be quite obvious that the
threshold is the lower the more lower tail skill groups are weighted in the distribution.
This is because it is less worthy for employers to disregard low-skilled workers if the
chance of locating a better skilled worker is small.
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5 Concluding remarks
The paper develops a model on wage formation in a search equilibrium. The model
extends the earlier works of Kultti (2000) and Kultti and Virrankoski (2004) by as-
suming vertically di¤erentiated workers. It turns out that, unlike under conventional
Nash bargaining, the equilibrium wages are non-linear in a sense that more skilled
workers earn strictly larger fraction of the matching surplus than workers belonging to
lower skill groups. The wage di¤erentials between the consecutive skill groups are the
greater the higher is their rank among the skill levels. Non-linear wages arises even
the buyers?(?rms?) preferences are homogeneous and the model does not include any
informational frictions whatsoever.
The non-linearity of wages imply that a mean-preserving spread in the skill dis-
tribution leads to greater wage dispersion. The model also predicts that countries
whose distribution of skills weight lower tail skill groups should exhibit large wage
dispersion. Regarding the e¤ect of increasing demand for labor, we show that greater
market tightness always increases lower tail wage di¤erentials. In the upper tail, how-
ever, we identify a La¤er-curve type relationship between market tightness and wage
gaps. When unemployed workers are the short side of the market, increasing demand
tends to widen the upper tail wage di¤erentials. When vacant jobs are the short side,
higher demand actually compresses upper tail wages.
Our theory also helps to understand the widely recognized ?skill premium puzzle?.
Non-linear wages imply that high-skilled workers are able to gain disproportionately
from a general upgrade in productivity. This observation mitigates the need for strong
skill-biased technological change to explain the simultaneous increase in both supply
and price of skilled labor.
The supplementary Section 4 presents the analysis under somewhat weaker as-
sumptions than was done in the basic model. It turns out that the ?bargaining power?
of the lower tail skill groups may collapse completely and a subset of lower tail skill
groups may have to trade at zero (or minimum) wages. The rest of the wage schedule




A Proof of Lemma 1
A.1 Veri?cation of Conjecture 1
Proof. Condition (i): The worker prefers waiting if hi ¸ U0i : By Conjecture 1 we






1 = 1 8k 2 f1; :2; :::; ng and ·ki > 1 for i > k. Then the
condition hi ¸ U0i obtains
hi =
®
® + ¯ + r
¡








, U 0i ·
®
® ¡ (»i ¡ 1)¯ + r
¡
Qi ¡ V 0
¢
; (19)




i (F (xk)¡ F (xk¡1)) > 1; since ·ki > 1










Qi ¡ V 0
¢ · ®
® ¡ (»i ¡ 1) ¯ + r
¡
Qi ¡ V 0
¢
:
Condition (ii): Upon a meeting, the employer is willing to trade at the equilibrium
wage wi if Vi ¸ V 0. Remembering that Vi = Qi ¡ Ui, it follows immediately from (8)
that Vj ¸ Vi for every j > i. Thus, it su¢ces to show that V1 ¸ V 0. Now,
V1 = Q1 ¡ U1 = Q1 ¡ ® (®+ r)
(® + r)2 + ¯r
¡
Q1 ¡ V 0
¢
=
r (®+ ¯ + r)
(® + r)2 + ¯r
Q1 +
® (® + r)
(®+ r)2 + ¯r
V 0:
V1 ¸ V 0 , Q1 ¸ ©;
which is equivalent to having q1 ¸ r© = Á.
A.2 Veri?cation of Conjecture 2
Proof. Assume an unemployed worker has received a wage o¤er and decided to wait
and search for alternative contacts.
(i) Imagine ?rst the situation where the unemployed has located another employer
candidate. By Bertrand argument we know that in this kind of situation employers
raise their wage o¤ers until driven to their reservation utilities. If the unemployed did
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not accept the highest o¤er but opted to search even more contacts, he would locate
another employer at rate ®. A third bidder on the employers? side, however, would not
increase the highest available bid, which would still be the wage level that produces the
reservation utility for the employer. On the other hand, there is a possibility that the
competing ?rms receive applications from other unemployed workers, which creates
a downside risk to the ?incumbent? worker. Since there is no upside potential, the
unemployed is not willing to wait further in a situation where two ?rms are competing.
(ii) The second possibility is that the incumbent worker ?nds himself competing
with a rival candidate. Assume the incumbent worker belongs to skill group i and
the rival candidate to group j s.t. i > j. Then the newcomer could earn U 0j and
the incumbent U^ ji = U
0
j + ¢Qi;j. Let us ?rst show that further waiting would again
entail a down-side risk. If a third candidate belonging to group k · j happened to
appear, then the competition would still take place between the incumbent and the
second candidate, and they would earn U^ ji and U
0
j respectively. If k > j, then the
second candidate would ?drop out? and still earn U 0j while the incumbent would earn
U^ki < U^
j




i , if k ¸ i, so that the incumbent candidate would
be strictly worse-o¤. Hence the possibility of a third candidate arriving induces a
down-side risk. Then we need to show that there is no upside potential available form
further waiting in a situation where two workers have a contact with a single ?rm.
The incumbent (the better skilled) worker locates an alternative employer at rate ®.
Then the reservation value for the ?rst employer is determined by the case where it
is left alone with the second candidate belonging to group j; i.e. it can trade at a
wage that produces Qj ¡ Uj . Hence the highest wage o¤er, ~w, in the bidding game
between the two ?rms competing for the worker belonging to group i is determined










is strictly less than U^ ji , there is no upside potential for the better skilled candidate. By
the similar reasoning, the highest utility the less skilled worker could earn by waiting
and locating another employer is ~U ij = Ui ¡¢Qi;j . By (13) it is easy to see that the
present value of this scenario is less than the utility available for the less skilled from
immediate trading; i.e.







We have know veri?ed that workers of any type cannot gain from further waiting in
a situation where two competing workers have the contact with the same employer.
In fact, further waiting would make any worker strictly worse o¤. This observation,
in turn, implies that if the single employer did not accept the lowest wage demand
in the competitive situation, workers would be better o¤ by leaving the employer and
starting to look for alternative vacancies. Knowing this, the single employer infers
that he is better o¤ by accepting the lowest o¤er.
Points (i) and (ii) together imply that trading will take place once a competitive
situation is triggered on either employers? or workers? side.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the wage di¤erential between skill groups
xi and xi+2 and assume ¢qi+2;i+1 = ¢qi+1;i = ¢¹q. A mean-preserving spread of F (¢)
within the skill groups fxi; xi+1; xi+2g then yields a new distribution G (¢) s.t. °
workers belonging to group xi+1 is upgraded to group xi+2 and an equal number, °,
downgraded to group xi; i.e.
G (xi+2) = F (xi+2) + °;
G (xi+1) = F (xi+1)¡ °;
G (xi) = F (xi) + °:
Then the new wage gap is given by
¢wnewi+2;i = [ªi+1(G (xi+1)) + ªi(G (xi))]¢¹q
= [ªi+1(F (xi+1)¡ °) + ªi(F (xi) + °)]¢¹q
> [ªi+1(F (xi+1)) + ªi(F (xi))]¢¹q = ¢w
old
i+2;i:
The last inequality follows from the fact that ªs is increasing and concave in the value
of the cumulative distribution function.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Since ® = µm(µ) and ¯ = m(µ), ªs can be written as
ªs =
(µm(µ) + r) (µm(µ) + F (xs)m(µ))

















K (µ) (µ + F (xs))
[K (µ)]2 +K (µ) ¡ (1¡ F (xs)) µ
;








[K (µ)]2 [1 +K (µ)¡ K 0 (µ) (µ + F (xs))] +
+ (1¡ F (xs)) [K (µ)F (xs)¡ µK 0 (µ) (µ + F (xs))]g : (20)











[K (µ)]2 ¡ µ2K 0 (µ)
K (µ)
+
+K (µ) (K (µ)¡ µK 0 (µ))]g :
Now








[K (µ)]2 ¡ µ2K 0 (µ) = rµ
[m(µ)]2





Hence the lower tail wage di¤erentials unambiguously increase as labor markets be-
come tighter.









[K (µ)]2 [1 +K (µ)¡ K 0 (µ) (µ + 1)]ª :
Since
1 +K (µ)¡ µK 0 (µ)¡ K 0 (µ) = r
[m(µ)]





(®0(µ) + ¯ 0(µ)) ;
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the upper tail wages become more dispersed along with greater market tightness only
if ®0(µ) + ¯0(µ) > 0.








[K (µ)]2 + µ2
¢
K (µ)¡ µK 0 (µ)
#
:
The above analysis implies that F (¹xs) 2 [0; 1], so that the negative relationship be-
tween wage dispersion and market tightness is possible only within upper tail skill
groups but not within some subset of types fxi; xi+1; :::; xkg s.t. k < n.
D Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. It is easy to verify that hFj+1 > h
F
j . Therefore, if it can be shown that h
F
1 ¸
V 0, then we know that employers will never opt to disregard a waiting unemployed.
The value of waiting with the least able worker obtains
hF1 =
®
®+ ¯ + r
V 0 +
¯
®+ ¯ + r
¡
Q1 ¡ U 01
¢
:
On the other hand, the implicit wage equation h1 = U1 can be solved for U01 to obtain
U01 =
®2
(® + r)2 + ¯r
¡
Q1 ¡ V 0
¢
:
Combining these two expressions and remembering that free-entry implies V 0 = ©,




® (® + 2r) + r (¯ + r)
¯ (2®+ ¯ + r)
¶
©:
E Proof of Lemma 3
E.1 Veri?cation of Conjecture 1
Proof. For skill groups xi < xt; this condition is trivial. For skill groups xi > xt;
the proof is completely isomorphic with Appendix A.1.
For skill groups xi < xt; we have Vi = Qi > V 0 = ©: For skill groups xi > xt; it
su¢ces to show that Vt ¸ V 0, because Vj ¸ Vi for every j > i. By the de?nition of
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the threshold skill level xt we know that hFt ¸ V 0. Hence, if Vt ¸ hFt , then condition
(ii) is automatically satis?ed. Now,
Vt ¡ hFt = Qt ¡ ht ¡ hFt
= Qt ¡ ®+ ¯
®+ ¯ + r
Qt > 0:
E.2 Veri?cation of Conjecture 2
Proof. The conjecture has to do with skill groups xi ¸ xt: For proof, see Appendix
A.2.
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